The Dreyfus-McDowell Debate and the Limits of Reason by Hollingsworth, Elliot Johnson
	 1	
The Dreyfus-McDowell Debate and the Limits of Reason 
 
Those who want to find a home, a native soil, safety, must make the sacrifice of belief. Those 
who stick to the mind, do not return. 
 
Helmuth Plessner 
 
 
Caspar David Friedrich (1819) 
 
 
Submitted by Elliot Johnson Hollingsworth to the University of Exeter 
 as a thesis for the degree of  
Masters by Research in Philosophy  
January 2018. 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 
no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no 
material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any 
other University. 
 
	 2	
Abstract 
 
In the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, John McDowell makes the claim that what makes 
us distinctively human is our all-pervasive conceptual rationality. Hubert Dreyfus, on 
the other hand, argues that we are, at our best, absorbed in the world and only ‘part 
time’ rational animals. Who is right? I appraise the debate, and proceed to then focus 
my analysis on two core issues: the Linguistic Community of McDowell, and the non-
qualitative phenomenology of Dreyfus. I conclude that Dreyfus and McDowell cannot 
explain how we ‘step back from’ and ‘step in to’ the world, respectively. I propose a 
mediatory account between Dreyfus and McDowell’s claim through Helmuth 
Plessner’s concept of ‘eccentric positionality’. In employing psychopathological 
research, providing Plessner’s eccentric positionality as an instructive model, I 
suggest that we can see the disruption of eccentricity as a cornerstone of the 
‘ontological confusion’ of personhood found in people with schizophrenia. 
Furthermore, I will propose that in this disruption of eccentricity, we are led to similar 
issues found in Dreyfus’ non-qualitative phenomenology, and the issues faced with 
McDowell’s linguistic community. This suggests a need for a reconciliation of both of 
their claims, which can be made through Plessner’s eccentric positionality. 
Therefore, I will suggest that both Dreyfus and McDowell are describing reciprocal 
aspects of the nature of the human being, which are in fact complementary and 
necessary to one another. However, these two positions need to be consolidated 
through Plessner’s eccentric positionality to account for the human being, for, to be 
the human, is to be eccentric. 
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The Dreyfus-McDowell Debate and the Limits of Reason 
 
What could be more natural than to hold that the capacities that belong to what 
differentiates human beings from other animals, their rationality, are operative in 
activity that is essentially human? 
 
- John McDowell 
 
Rather than take for granted that critical rationality is the defining feature of human 
beings we should ask: What is rationality? Is it required? Should it be? 
  
- Hubert Dreyfus 
 
What are the limits of reason? John McDowell claims that what makes us 
distinctively human is our all-pervasive conceptual rationality. Hubert Dreyfus, on the 
other hand, argues that we are only part time rational animals. These two claims 
have provoked the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate, which is, as Joseph Schear notes, 
“the extent to which conceptual rationality is involved in our skilful embodied rapport 
with the world” (Schear 2013, 2). My intention for this paper is to present, critique 
and then to mediate, between the two philosopher’s claims. Both have compelling 
points. However, I argue that Dreyfus cannot explain how we ‘step back’ into 
reflection. I further argue that McDowell does not address the distinctively human 
pre-requisites for rationality enabling us to ‘step in’ to the world. I propose that we 
can bridge this gulf with Helmuth Plessner’s concept of ‘eccentric positionality’, in 
which we modulate between being the lived body and the body-as-object. In an 
analysis of schizophrenia research and in light of its disturbance of eccentric 
positionality, I reflect the sort of symptoms and behaviours that highlight Dreyfus-
McDowell’s weaknesses in their claims. In analysing eccentricity’s disruption in 
people with schizophrenia, I propose that we see a split into either Dreyfus or 
McDowell’s claims. From this, I conclude that both Dreyfus and McDowell are 
explaining aspects of the human being that can, in fact, complement one another 
when reconciled together under Plessner’s concept of human eccentricity.  
 Chapter One will introduce and review the Dreyfus-McDowell debate. 
McDowell claims that we are essentially rational animals, for “what could be more 
natural than to hold that the capacities that belong to what differentiates human 
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beings from other animals, their rationality, are operative in activity that is essentially 
human, including activity at the ground-floor level?” (McDowell 2013a, 54). Hence, 
McDowell’s argument is that our experiences as human beings are essentially 
saturated with conceptual rationality. It is only through an initiation into a linguistic 
community that we become ‘minded’, which allows us to “enjoy the full normativity 
which for McDowell is the essence of mentality” (Thomas 1997, 88 quoted in Zahavi 
2013, 324). For McDowell, this “constitutes a background without which the special 
way in which experience takes hold of the world would not be intelligible” (McDowell 
1996, 33). On the other hand, in his 2005 American Philosophical Association 
Presidential address, Hubert Dreyfus contests McDowell's claim. Dreyfus proposes 
that “rather than take for granted that critical rationality is the defining feature of 
human beings we should ask: What is rationality? Is it required? Should it be?” 
(Dreyfus 2013, 26). For Dreyfus, we are pre-conceptually and pre-linguistically 
absorbed into the world. These, to quote Dreyfus, “embodied skills, when we are 
fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non-mental content that is non-
conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational […] and non-linguistic.” (Dreyfus 2007b, 
360). In this chapter, I will take particular consideration of the levy of detached rule-
following that Dreyfus charges against McDowell, and the concessions that are 
made by Dreyfus subsequently after. Subsequently, I address, both for Dreyfus and 
McDowell, their arguments for the link between unreflective and reflective action. I 
raise issues regarding McDowell’s proposal of sharing a ‘conceptual form’ to link 
unreflective action and reflection. I also address McDowell through considering 
arguments, such as those of Gareth Evans, against a conceptualist analysis of 
colour perception; rather, non-conceptualists argue that there fine-grainedness of 
non-conceptual content that eludes conceptualism. 
 Chapter Two will take focus on Dreyfus’ absence of an ego in absorption and 
McDowell’s linguistic community. First, I will address McDowell’s transition from the 
‘proto-subjectivity’ of pre-rational infants, to their transition into the ‘fully fledged 
subjectivity’ of mature, rational human beings, who are ‘truly minded’. In employing 
the works on Michael Tomasello’s ‘we intentionality’ of infants, as well as Merlin 
Donald’s notion of ‘mimesis’, there appears to be a pre-linguistic strata of experience 
that suggests a form of collective or ‘we’ mindedness that eludes and precedes 
McDowell’s conceptual rationality. Second, in an analysis of Dreyfus, I will address 
his absorbed coping claim. I argue that, given absorption at its best requires zero 
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self-monitoring, it seems difficult to ascertain how the ego comes back into play, or 
why it is necessary at all if we perform at our best in this absorption. Furthermore, 
Dreyfus proposes that humans have a ‘mineness’, which does not rely on 
experience, but rather the context of one’s solicitations. However, I suggest that it 
appears to be questionable how we can speak of a non-qualitative phenomenology, 
or if we can even attribute a phenomenology to these concepts of absorption and 
mineness. Given the issue of Dreyfus’ inability to explain how one steps out of the 
world into reflection; and, given the issue of McDowell’s conceptual rationality not 
being exhaustive of human experience, I argue that we require a mediation between 
the two philosopher’s claims. 
 In Chapter Three, I seek to reconcile Dreyfus and McDowell’s claims through 
Helmuth Plessner’s conception of ‘eccentric positionality’. For Plessner, the human is 
a psychophysical unity. The human, as an eccentric being, is both a lived body (body 
as immediately experienced) and she is also the body-as-object (the body that can 
be objectified), and, thirdly, she has an eccentricity (‘eccentric positionality’) through 
which she is both. Helmuth Plessner, as the Plessner Society notes, formulated a 
concept of philosophy “according to which the ground of philosophical reassurance 
lies not in knowledge guaranteed by pure reason, nor in the primacy of action” 
(Plessner Society). For Plessner, rather than turning exclusively to rationality or a 
non-qualitative absorption, he sought for an empirically and phenomenologically 
viable solution that situates human beings in the world, whilst also acknowledging 
their differentiation from other beings. Whilst taking language and rationality as of 
importance, Plessner saw the wider span of life and expressiveness of life as of 
equal importance, a recognition of the human being’s distinctive ‘in-betweenness’1. 
In the final part of Chapter Three, I will provide empirical evidence of clinical studies 
into the psychopathology of schizophrenia in relation to Plessner’s claim. This, I 
believe, can shed further on light on the troublesome aspects of Dreyfus and 
McDowell’s claims, and, ultimately, displays how the two claims can be reconciled, 
                                                
1 The term ‘in-betweenness’, which I have employed as another term to explain Plessner’s 
‘eccentricity’ or ‘modulation’, is with reference to Joel Krueger’s (2018) analysis of 
twentieth century Japanese philosopher Watsuji TetsurÃ, and his notion of ‘aidagra’, whose 
concepts bear a great resemblance, particularly with the leib/körper modulation, to Plessner’s 
own works. 
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when it is acknowledged they are in fact necessary for one another, via Plessner’s 
eccentric human. 
Chapter One 
The Dreyfus-McDowell Debate 
 
It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the 
existence of things outside us [...] must be accepted merely on faith, and that if 
anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by 
any satisfactory proof 
 
- Immanuel Kant 
 
A centipede was happy – quite! 
Until a toad in fun 
Said, "Pray, which leg moves after which?" 
This raised her doubts to such a pitch, 
She fell exhausted in the ditch 
Not knowing how to run. 
 
- Katherine Craster 
 
In this first chapter, I introduce the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John 
McDowell, addressing some of the key issues concerning their claims. First, I will, 
situate John McDowell’s claim for conceptual rationality, which will be situated on the 
background of his critiques of foundationalism and his addressment of Wilfrid Sellars’ 
Myth of the Given and Immanuel Kant’s Critique. McDowell attempts to provide a 
remedy to resolve the ‘anxieties’ that reside in Western philosophy, the link between 
mind and world, in his aptly named book Mind and World. McDowell makes the claim 
for the ‘all pervasiveness’ of conceptual rationality in human lives insofar as our lives 
are distinctively human to help bridge this anxiety. In contrast, in his 2005 American 
Philosophical Association Presidential Address, “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: 
How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise” 
Hubert Dreyfus (2005) attacks McDowell's conceptual rationality claim. Dreyfus 
proposes that McDowell overreaches in his claim for the pervasiveness of 
conceptual rationality in human beings to account for our richly normatively 
structured world. He suggests, and queries, that “rather than take for granted that 
critical rationality is the defining feature of human beings we should ask: What is 
	 8	
rationality? Is it required? Should it be?” (Dreyfus 2013, 26). For Dreyfus, rather than 
humans being pervasively conceptually rational, they also have a pre-conceptual, 
pre-rational non-self-monitoring absorption in the world, which we share with infants 
and non-human animals alike. As Dreyfus writes, our “embodied skills, when we are 
fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non-mental content that is non-
conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational […] and non-linguistic” (Dreyfus 2007b, 
360). In summary, Dreyfus argued that McDowell overreaches in his ability to bridge 
the gap between mind and world, by placing a normatively structured world solely in 
the realm of the mental. The clash of two philosophical titans thus began.  
 This chapter will proceed to address some key issues on both sides of the 
debate. I will address Dreyfus’ ‘skilful coping’, his phenomenology of skill acquisition 
and ‘average everyday’ coping in the world, where Dreyfus posits a transition from 
the beginner coper to the expert coper (think of someone riding a bike and becoming 
more proficient, until one ‘just does it’ without thinking, for example). This, he argues, 
runs contrary to McDowell’s ‘rule following’ beginner, the kind of propositional and 
conceptual ideas that revolve around McDowell’s conceptual rationality. Yet, is it 
really the case that when we are within the realm of our peak performances that we 
do not have any recourse to some form performance-enhancing reflection? I will then 
proceed to address Dreyfus and McDowell’s discussion of unreflective action and 
reflection. Dreyfus posits that unreflective action, the sort of absorbed coping that he 
claims for, eludes McDowell’s conceptualism. McDowell, however, argues that there 
is a shared conceptual form between unreflective and reflective action. I will appraise 
this discussion, additionally considering particular non-conceptualist accounts of 
perception, such as that of Gareth Evans’ colour perception argument.  
 
1.1 Mind and World 
How do we situate the mind in the world and our capacities for rationality and 
reason? That which we can refer to as ‘mind’ is what Sellars (1997) terms as 
belonging to the normatively structured ‘logical space of reasons’. This is, as 
McDowell wrote, "[a] normative context [that] is necessary for the idea of being in 
touch with the world at all, whether knowledgeable or not" (McDowell 1996, xiv). The 
normative significance of the space of reasons is distinct from the ‘logical space of 
nature’. This distinction is made because the logical space of nature ‘impinges’ on 
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our sensory experience, meaning that this space is unable to point to something that 
is correct in light of something else; judgement belongs in the space of reasons. 
Therefore, because a mental state is to be directed towards the world, as a belief, for 
instance, this mental state needs to be within a normative context. Hence, to have a 
belief or judgement is to have a normatively structured link between mind (the space 
of reasons) and the world (the space of nature) - something that is answerable to the 
world as it is. But how does one link to the other? For this does not explain how our 
experiences provide us with the rational test for our beliefs. How, then, do our beliefs 
and experience connect with how the world is as it is? We come, as John McDowell 
surmises, to an issue that is characteristic of the “anxieties of modern philosophy 
that centre […] on the relation between mind and world” (McDowell 1996, x). This is, 
in McDowell’s Mind and World (1996), something which he seeks to reconcile. 
Before turning to McDowell’s ‘remedy’, as he words it in his medically-infused 
‘diagnostic spirit’, let us first address some of the issues of mind and world that 
McDowell seeks to remedy, beginning with Immanuel Kant. 
 As Kant remarked, “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind” (Kant 1781/1929, 93, A51, B75), meaning that this interlinking of 
intuition, thought and concept are what makes an overall experience possible. The 
intuition is the faculty of receptivity, what one might say is the faculty of receiving the 
sensory way that the world is ‘such and such’; concepts2 are exercised by the 
‘faculty of spontaneity’ via active judgement. Kant proposed an answer to remedy the 
anxieties of the relation of mind and world. Kant’s ‘critical enquiry concerning the 
limits of my possible knowledge’ (Kant 1781/1929, a758/B786), proposed a 
delimitation of our knowledge to only that which can be known; this is not to the 
object in of itself, but to the mode of how we experience the object. Kant follows the 
tradition of his predecessors before him in that the spontaneity of thinking is required 
to relate to a particular given content as objective. The synthesis, combination and 
structure that comprises thought can only function qua thought if there is something 
present in the first place: something ‘given’. However, Kant also departs from 
tradition, for the given does not exceed our particular mode of representation, for 
                                                
2 I employ the general definition of ‘concept’ as the articulation of “possessing a 
concept”. One possesses a concept C iff she believes that C. However, alternatives 
to this definition, such as Frege’s notion of concepts, weigh in heavily in the 
conceptuality debate as a whole (see Byrne 2004, 231). 
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“the given must conform to our mode of representation and is never external to it” 
(Kant 1781/1929, preface). So here we see that, in empirical judgements, the 
aspects of concepts and intuition work interdependently, for thoughts require some 
intuitive content, and intuitions must be structured by concepts. However, for 
McDowell, Kant still commits to a dualism between, on the one hand, a world of 
appearances that conforms to our knowledge and, on the other, the world as it is 
itself, the noumenal world, in which the object in and of itself is unknown to us, that is 
‘supersensible’, yet causes our representations. For McDowell, Kant either fails 
because our representations refer to a ‘Given’ that is supersensible to us, and hence 
unknowable to us, and we thereby fall into what Sellars termed the Myth of the Given 
(1997). Or, secondly, Kant fails because he renounces external constraints on our 
thinking. As Crispin Wright notes, “McDowell’s agenda […] is shaped through and 
through by the challenge of overcoming the Kantian legacy of minds’ alienation from 
an unknowable noumenal reality” (Wright 1991, 235).  
Further risks of alienation between mind and world are elucidated in 
McDowell’s critique of Foundationalism and Coherentism, of which the former I will 
address in particular. McDowell reverses the traditional philosophical order of, first, 
seeking out the nature of perception to subsequently show how we can have rational 
beliefs regarding the world, for he takes rational beliefs regarding the world to show 
that, essentially, the nature of perception is conceptually structured. McDowell, in the 
Sellarsian spirit locates perception within the “logical space of reasons” as the 
normative space in which our claims can be justified. However, the Foundationalist 
claim, which is an epistemological claim, posits a hierarchical structure to 
knowledge, in which there is a fundamental entity that is epistemically basic from 
which higher levels of knowledge rests upon, inferentially, and thus constituted by 
this foundational tier in a world that “is dominated by a certain modern conception of 
natural law” which generates the conception of what valid knowing is, that Charles 
Taylor terms the “Inner/Outside (I/O) position (Taylor 2002, 106). This knowledge 
cannot be reasoned via prior evidence; for it is regarding facts which are irreducible, 
unconceptualised sense-data. Higher knowledge is presupposed via knowledge 
presented to the mind at the fundamental level. Yet, as stated, this foundational 
epistemic entity is not presupposed by anything in or of itself (Echelbarger 1974, 
231). For McDowell, situating the rational human as beings in a natural world proves 
problematic, in its current conception, in which contemporary physical science 
	 11	
provides a description of what Wright notes to be the “metaphysics of what the 
natural world essentially is, a ‘Realm of Law’” (Wright 2002,141). 
This, therefore, results in our beliefs being founded on unconceptualised 
sense data, leading to no rational connection between mind and world. Perception 
requires sensibility, a response to the environment, enabled by physiological sensory 
systems (McDowell 2008, 2). Yet, as McDowell adds, our sensibility does not belong 
to reason; we share this sensibility with non-rational animals and, following Sellars, 
“the rational faculty that distinguishes us from non-rational animals must also be 
operative in our being perceptually Given things to know” (McDowell 2009, 2). This 
problem here, then, is, as alluded to earlier, what Sellars termed the ‘Myth of the 
Given’ (Sellars 1997). The Myth of the Given is a myth because sensibility, which we 
share with animals, in of itself, without the inclusion of conceptual capacities that 
belong to the human being’s distinct rationality, cannot make things available for 
cognition. For, as McDowell writes, “[…] the sense of a Myth would be an availability 
for cognition to subjects whose getting what is supposedly Given to them does not 
draw on capacities required for the sort of cognition in question […] being given 
something for knowledge without needing to have capacities that would be 
necessary for one to be able to get to know it” (McDowell 2008, 1-2).  
 The Myth figures into our perceptual knowledge because it is inadequate to 
speak of sensibility in of itself being able to make things available to our cognition, 
absent of rational faculties. Generally, Sellars’ dictum regarding the Myth of the 
Given rests, though not exclusively, on C. I. Lewis’ (1929) distinction between 
sensory data, “which are presented or given to the mind” and the “construction or 
interpretation which the mind brings to this data” (Lewis 1929, 52). The immediate, 
basic data the mind receives is then interpreted under a conceptual scheme, within 
the ‘space of reasons’ (the space of norms and meaning), thereby forming higher 
levels of knowledge. The causal input from the external world enacts our sensory 
capacities to modify and correct our beliefs. Hence, the truth of the external world is 
testable, and proves that our representations, our conceptual scheme of the world, 
refers to and proves the existence of actual objects that cause our representations. 
As McDowell notes, this Givenness of knowledge to a reflecting subject can be 
‘innocuous’. Yet, on further analysis, it becomes ‘pernicious’. This is because 
“Givenness in the sense of the Myth would be an availability for cognition to subjects 
whose getting what is supposedly Given to them does not draw on capacities 
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required for the sort of cognition in question”. He continues, “if that is what 
Givenness would be, […] it must be mythical” (McDowell 2008, 1). For something to 
be Given, one is given something that we can crudely term as ‘knowledge’. However, 
one lacks the conceptual capacities that are necessary for one to receive it, and “that 
is incoherent” (McDowell 2008, 2), for the bestowal of knowledge takes place in the 
“logical space of reasons”, which is the space of “justifying and being able to justify 
what one says” (Sellars 1997, $36). Hence, as Tim Crane notes, “one’s experience 
cannot serve as the justification for one’s empirical beliefs” (2013, 229). Furthermore, 
as those in the phenomenological tradition have noted, we do not have sensations, 
rather, we can only sense that we are sensing, for one can never sense the cause of 
our sensations. Therefore, for Sellars, the fundamental issue for those who take the 
Given as…well, a given, is that: 
 
[…] instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have 
noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already 
to have the concept of that sort of thing and cannot account for it” (Sellars 
1997, 176). 
 
The second claim, which I lightly touch upon, that McDowell rallies against, is what 
Donald Davidson termed as the ‘Coherentist position’ (Davidson 1983; Rorty 1998). 
This is where our beliefs are only justified by other beliefs and are true if they are 
coherent with these other beliefs. Yet, as Davidson noted, “[…] we can’t get outside 
our skins to find out what is causing the internal happening of which we are aware” 
(Davidson 1986, 307). Furthermore, as McDowell argues, this renders our beliefs not 
about anything, for there is a constant point of deferral to another belief, and then a 
deferral to another belief, and so on. The Coherentist lacks any explanation of how 
true beliefs cohere, without a ‘solidity’, so to speak, for our judgements and beliefs 
regarding the world. Additionally, we are left questioning what coherence actually 
even is. One cannot make an argument that experience can justify a subject’s beliefs 
or judgement, because nothing can be a justification for a belief beyond another 
belief. We are left, as McDowell writes, ‘frictionless spinning in a void’. 
 
1.2 A World Embraceable in Thought  
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To reconcile this gulf between mind and world, McDowell proposed a ‘minimal 
empiricism’, which “drops Kant’s transcendental framework” (McDowell 1996, 43-44). 
For McDowell, the Given needs to conform to our mode of representation, yes, but 
“the world is not external to the space of concepts” (McDowell 1996, 146). As 
McDowell noted, for Sellars there is nothing inherently wrong with a ‘Given’, that 
things are given to us for our knowledge. Rather, the Given only becomes mythical if 
we “fail to impose the necessary requirements on getting what is given […] avoiding 
the Myth requires capacities that belong to reason to be operative in experiencing 
itself, not just in judgements in which we respond to experience”. The Given needs to 
conform to our mode of representation, for “the constraints come from outside 
thinking, but not from outside what is thinkable” (McDowell 2008, 3). McDowell 
makes the claim that humans are essentially rational animals. He proposes that 
“conceptual rationality is everywhere in our lives in so far as our lives are distinctively 
human”, for “conceptual capacities are already operative in the deliverances of 
sensibility themselves” (McDowell 2007, 338). Hence, the immediate ‘output’ of our 
observation is already conceptual, the inner/outer distinction between mind and 
world collapses to an extent, and humans become ‘open to the world’. Our 
immediate experience of the world is already conceptual in nature for, to employ 
Sellarsian language, it is “the idea of knowledge as a position in the space of 
reasons’’ or having ‘‘a normative status’’ (Sellars 1997, 187). Hence, as McDowell 
writes, “a belief or judgement [is] to the effect that things are ‘thus and so’” 
(McDowell 1996, x). The normative space of thought and perceptual experience 
cannot be given from the outside in; rather, “the norms of thought are instead 
indigenous to thought itself or self-legislated, as we might say. Thought is therefore 
autonomous with respect to precisely the same world that must rationally constrain it 
in experience” (Forman 2008, 564).  
 As we can see, then, a knowledgeable perceptual judgement, McDowell 
(2008) argues, has its rational intelligibility, in the light of the subject’s experience, 
because she judges that “that things are thus and so” (McDowell 2008, 2). This idea 
allows for the passivity and receptivity of our thought’s being constrained by the 
world, hence evading Kant’s issue of the noumenal world, and additionally it evades 
Sellars’ Myth, because a human being’s sensibility is inherently conceptual. We are 
never led to a non-conceptual ‘Given’ as the basis for the justification of our 
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perceptual beliefs, as we otherwise see in Foundationalism and Coherentism, and 
the noumenal world of Kant. As McDowell writes: 
 
If these relations [between perceptual contents and the beliefs perceptions 
give us reason to form] are to be genuinely recognizable as reason-
constituting, we cannot conﬁne spontaneity within a boundary across which 
the relations are supposed to hold. The relations themselves must be able to 
come under the self-scrutiny of active thinking. (McDowell 1994 quoted in 
Speaks 2005, 14). 
 
We can tease out this idea of McDowell’s by laying it out in an outline, as articulated 
by Jeff Speaks (2005, 14). 
 
1. Perceptions provide agents with reasons for forming certain beliefs. 
2.  If perceptions provide agents with reasons for forming beliefs, the contents of 
those perceptions must be conceptual. 
C. The contents of perceptions must be conceptual (1,2) 
 
Hence, if perception p justifies subject A to believe in p, A must have the ability to 
discriminate the relation between p and x. Hence, A will be able to think and draw 
the relation between p and x. Therefore, we support (2), because an aspect of A’s 
thought process is her ability to think about the perceptual content and the content of 
the belief’s formation. If the content of her perception x is a part of her thought p, the 
perceptual content of A’s thought, then perceptual content cannot be said to be 
absolutely non-conceptual and thus cannot be a different sort of entity than that 
which are in the contents of thought - thoughts that are external. As McDowell writes, 
“there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing on can mean, or generally the 
sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case […] there is no 
gap between thought, as such, and the world. (McDowell 1996, 27). We have here, 
then, McDowell’s conceptual rationality claim for the human being, where human 
experience is saturated by rationality.   
  
1.3 The Myth of the Mental 
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In response to McDowell’s Mind and World, in his 2005 APA Presidential 
Address, Hubert Dreyfus queries that “[c]an we accept McDowell’s Sellarsian claim 
that perception is conceptual ‘all the way out,’ thereby denying the more basic 
perceptual capacities we seem to share with pre-linguistic infants and higher 
animals?” (Dreyfus 2006, 43). Dreyfus offers a critique of McDowell’s conceptual 
rationality, and additionally provides his non-conceptual account of human 
experience, by claiming that we are, at the ‘ground floor’, engaged in our skilful and 
embodied coping. This is non-conceptual, pre-linguistic and pre-rational (Dreyfus 
2006), drawn off the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin 
Heidegger3; thus, Dreyfus proposes a limitation to McDowell’s conceptual-rationality. 
As Dreyfus acknowledges, McDowell echoes the existential phenomenologists, in 
that we “find ourselves already engaged with the world” and the “acting subject is 
[…] herself embodied […] (Dreyfus, 2009, 1). However, unlike Dreyfus, McDowell 
argues that even our embodied engagement in the world is permeated by conceptual 
rationality. Hence, for McDowell, perception and embodied action must be 
conceptual pervasively. Yet, for Dreyfus, the meaningfulness of our embodied, skilful 
coping comes first. McDowell’s sort of rationality is the ‘upper floor’, presupposed by 
our pre-conceptual, pre-linguistic ‘ground floor’. Even when taking part in highly 
conceptual activities, say performing theoretical experiments, it is the bottom floor, 
the fundamental, which makes conceptual activity possible in the first place. To 
recall, McDowell, in the Kantian spirit, argues that: 
 
[E]xperiences are actualisations of our sentient nature in which conceptual 
capacities are inextricably implicated. The parallel is this, intentional bodily 
capacities are actualisations of our nature in which conceptual capacities are 
inextricably implicated (McDowell 2016, 15) 
 
Yet, Dreyfus charges McDowell with overreaching in his attempt to reconcile Sellars’ 
issue of the Myth of the Given; McDowell is, instead, committing what Dreyfus levies 
against him as the ‘Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental’ (2005). This is the myth 
                                                
3 I agree with Wrathall (2014) that Dreyfus, with too much modesty, attributes his 
insights too much to Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s works without taking his 
own due credit. 
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in which “all intelligibility is pervaded by rational capacities” where “the mind is 
everywhere the pure given is not” (2013, 1). To be specific, Dreyfus terms this a 
myth because “in order for the mind to relate to the world at all, every way we relate 
to the world must be pervaded by self-critical enquiry” (Dreyfus 2013, 16). Therefore, 
instead, Dreyfus proposed that we can take a weaker reading of rationality in the 
sense that rationality is just one aspect of the what human experience is, insofar as 
our lives are distinctively human, to borrow McDowell’s phrasing.  
Delving deeper into the debate, as we have seen, McDowell argues that the 
normative relation of mind and world to be held without committing Sellars’ Myth of 
the Given, conceptuality must pervade all of perception and action. Yet, Dreyfus 
argues that McDowell’s claim cannot be reconciled with phenomenological insights 
into our, what Heidegger termed ‘primordial’ (or foundational) way of being in the 
world, how we are absorbed in our everyday activities and our expert coping as 
dancers and chess masters, for example. This absorption is the most direct, 
unmediated way in which we experience the world, which has a privileged status 
over other forms of access to the world, such as rationality and language. It is only 
when our absorption is disrupted that we become detached into rationality, losing the 
richness of the grasp of the background familiarity with our world, as we are attracted 
(solicited) and repelled by the affordances (Gibson 1975; 1979) around us. Even 
when committing ourselves to rational or reflective practices, these conceptual 
faculties are premised on a rich normative background world, for our bodies maintain 
a normative grip on this world which is absent of facts, language and conceptual 
data. This, Dreyfus argues, is also how we can account for our world being 
meaningful. Drawing from Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, which can be translated to 
a ‘being-there’ or ‘existence’, Dasein is “that entity which in its Being has this very 
Being as an issue" (Heidegger 1927, 4: 32). Dreyfus’ claim rests on that fact that we 
are encapsulated by the World and are in the World, what Heidegger termed “Being-
in-the-world” (Heidegger 1927, 12:84). Dasein is inseparable from it and embedded 
within it, accustomed to its environment and its relationship to the entities around it. 
Dasein need not only represent and conceptualise, for it is, for most its time, 
entangled with ‘things’, absorbed in the ‘average everyday’ of its existence. For 
Dreyfus, we experience and engage with other entities in our day to day living by 
coping with them through an ‘equipmentality’. Dreyfus also employs 
phenomenological insight from Merleau-Ponty, who, for instance, writes of the ‘body-
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schema’, which is a “pre-reflective familiar state with the world depends on the body-
scheme, the body projecting its motorintentions into the world it inhabits (Umwelt) 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 112). The body schema is not represented in the traditional 
epistemological view. Rather this body schema exists towards it tasks; the body 
schema illuminates that one’s body is in the world (est au monde), what Taylor 
Carman terms the “bodily point of view” (2008, 90). Therefore, as Dreyfus argues, 
following the existentialist and phenomenological tradition, the world is “pervaded not 
by critical conceptuality but by lines of force” (Dreyfus 2013, 17) in which 
affordances, attracting and repelling us as forces, solicits our attention pre-
reflectively. Rationality, or what we can call a ‘detachment’ from this coping, is the 
top floor. To conclude, Dreyfus states that “[…] the alternative picture which merges 
once we deconstruct the mediational one, through a consistent metacritical turn, is 
one of an embodied agent, embedded in a society, and at grips with the world” 
(Dreyfus 1972, 280). 
Dreyfus contests that we do not fall back into the Myth of the Given through 
his phenomenology of embodied coping, because, in being solicited by an 
affordance, one is provided with a pre-conceptual ‘layout of reality’. Hence, through 
this, the embodied coper’s coping has intentional content, but “it just isn’t conceptual 
content” (Dreyfus 2005, 11). For Dreyfus, the dichotomy of the ‘bare Given’ and the 
‘thinkable’, is therefore a false one, because our ground floor coping “opens up the 
world by opening us to a meaningful Given – a Given that is non-conceptual but not 
bare” (Dreyfus 2005, 12 – my emphasis). Rather than defining the normative 
structure of our world solely in the space of reasons, then, we can, as Erik Rietveld 
suggests, take Dreyfus’ conception of a normatively structured world, as a 
“responsiveness to normative significance” (Rietveld 2010, 184). Through this 
responsiveness to normative significance, as hitherto stated, “the phenomena show 
that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of 
non-mental content that is non-conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational […] and 
non-linguistic” (Dreyfus 2007, 35). So, for Dreyfus, as we have seen, rather than 
humans being essentially rational animals, a ‘conceptuality thesis’, we also have a 
‘ground floor’ embodied, skilful coping, the non-conceptual aspect of perceptual 
experience that we share with infants and non-human animals alike, which provides 
us with a human being that eludes McDowell’s space of reasons. Therefore, under 
this non-conceptual coping thesis, we can view Dreyfus’ critique of McDowell as that 
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of McDowell missing out the ‘ground floor’ of the human being’s pre-linguistic, pre-
conceptual being, which allows us to maintain our optimal grip on the world. Rather, 
McDowell is ‘top floors all the way down’ missing the responsiveness to pre-reflective 
normative significance from which conceptuality is made possible. This is not to say 
that there is no conceptual rationality, an ability to ‘step back’ and reflect, in our lives, 
for we evidently make judgements on our perceptual experiences. As Zahavi notes, 
“[w]hat Dreyfus objects to, isn’t the concept per se, but rather the idea that the mind, 
thus defined, has as central and pervasive a role to play in our engagement with the 
world as McDowell thinks” (Zahavi 2013, 320). Furthermore, as George Olsen notes, 
“Dreyfus is not merely noting the difference between sub-personal information 
processing and personal level awareness” (Olsen 2013, 21); on the contrary, 
Dreyfus argues that humans have a practical understanding of their world which is a 
different kind to the understanding exhibited in conceptuality and linguistic 
articulation of the world around them, “characterized primarily in terms of conditions 
of improvement versus conditions of truth” (Olsen 2013. 21), a know-how rather than 
a knowing ‘that’. McDowell’s claim of conceptual-rational capacities brings about a 
detached self, one above the world, not in it, oriented to an independent reality 
(McDowell 2013a, 42)Hence, “in assuming that all intelligibility, even perception and 
skilful coping, must be, at least implicitly, conceptual […] Sellars and McDowell join 
Kant in endorsing what we might call the Myth of the Mental” (Dreyfus 2006, 46). 
Dreyfus concludes with the bold statement that “thus, like a Vulture, the Myth of the 
Mental feeds off the carcass of the Myth of the Given” (Dreyfus 2005, 7). 
 
1.4 Rule-Following and the Expert.  
  To develop his claim for absorbed coping, Dreyfus, following from his works 
on ‘skilful coping’, makes the distinction between the kind of expert coping (Dreyfus 
& Dreyfus 1980) that we do when we are at our best, absorbed in our activities, 
versus the ‘beginner’, who has the kind of detached rule following that Dreyfus 
equates to McDowell’s conceptual rationality. As we have seen, Dreyfus claims that, 
rather than being beings pervaded by conceptual rationality, it is our absorbed, 
embodied coping in the world, our skilful bodily (embodied) action in the world, which 
is the fundamental grounding of normative significance, for “this alternative 
conception of man and his ability to behave intelligently is really an analysis of the 
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way man’s skilful activity […] generates the human world” (Dreyfus 1992, 281). 
Dreyfus posited, amongst multiple intermediary steps, the distinction between the 
‘beginner’ and the ‘expert’ or ‘master’ embodied coper of skill acquisition. The 
beginner begins from the perspective of a ‘know that’ form of intelligence, following 
rules that are “context-free features that the beginner can recognize without previous 
experience in the domain” (Dreyfus 2005, 1). Dreyfus likens these rules to that of a 
computer following a programm, or the example of a learner driver learning to 
recognize “interpretation-free features such as speed (indicated by the 
speedometer)”, being given rules to shift the gear to x when the speedometer 
tachometer needle points to y. This is a slow way of doing things, for the reliance on 
contextually independent rules means that the beginner cannot respond to 
meaningful additional aspects of the situation at hand. To be fully absorbed is to be 
the master or expert. In this process, the beginner “make[s] judgments using strict 
rules and features, but with talent and a great deal of involved experience, the 
beginner develops into an expert who sees intuitively what to do without applying 
rules and making judgments at all” (2004, 253). Furthermore, as Dreyfus argues, in 
our ‘average everyday’ lives, we, too, are expert copers in the realm of the intra-
mundane, for “[s]omething similar happens to us […] when any activity from taking a 
walk, to being absorbed in a conversation, to giving a lecture is going really well. 
That is, whenever we are successfully finding our way around the world” (Dreyfus 
2014, 281). This involved absorbed coping is not just operative in the realms of the 
expert, in the sense of the baseball player, the dancer, the formula one driver, and 
so on. Rather, skilful coping “is instead simultaneously the highest and most basic 
form of engagement with the world” (Wrathall 2014, 4), for we are all master or 
expert skilful copers in our ‘average everyday’ lives, for the “everyday is the 
enveloping wholeness of Being" (Heidegger 1927; Steiner 1991, 15). So, with 
Dreyfus’ account of skill acquisition, this expert coping is done “without calculating 
and comparing alternatives […] what must be done, simply is done” (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus 1980, 253), leading to a phenomenological non-conceptualism that runs 
contrary to McDowell’s conceptual rationality. Have we found the limits to rationality? 
No, McDowell responds. 
 McDowell, on the contrary, argues that there is no issue with “acknowledging 
the pervasiveness of mind in a distinctly human life [that] is consistent with 
appreciating those phenomenological insights” (McDowell 2007a, 346). He argues 
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that this “constitutes a background without which the special way in which 
experience takes hold of the world would not be intelligible” (McDowell 1996, 33), for 
Dreyfus assumes that McDowell regards action as a form of detached rule following 
akin to the beginner coper. However, as Tony Cheng (2015) notes, McDowell, in his 
paper, “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule” (McDowell 1989), makes a concerted 
effort to relinquish this idea of the same kind of detached rule following that Dreyfus 
levies against him. Most notably, McDowell addresses Kripke’s analysis of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox, in which Wittgenstein writes: “this was our paradox: 
no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made out to accord with the rule” (Wittgenstein 1953, 201a). As McDowell 
writes: 
 
[Kripke’s] line of interpretation gets off on the wrong foot, when it credits 
Wittgenstein with acceptance of a “skeptical paradox” […] the reasoning that 
would lead to this “skeptical paradox” starts with something Wittgenstein aims 
to show up as a mistake, the assumption, in this case, that the understanding 
on which I act when I obey an order must be an interpretation. (McDowell 
1984, 236 quoted by Cheng 2015, 6) 
 
Saul Kripke illustrates the issue employing the dilemma of numerical addition. What 
is the rule of addition? Its application has numerous ways of application and 
interpretation, as well standard uses of, which can be employed with a finite set of 
applications, such as 5+13 = 18. As Kripke4 conceives of understanding as a species 
of interpretation, such as when I employ the use of a ‘plus’ function, I can interpret 
my past usages of this ‘plus’ function to conform to other deviant functions. To 
understand what I mean by ‘plus’, I must first have an interpretation of what ‘plus’ 
means. This, results in a paradox, because it either leads to scepticism or relativity 
(relying on how we have previously performed such functions). However, and most 
pertinently to Dreyfus’ criticism is that, in response to this skeptical paradox, 
McDowell replies that this is only a paradox if we conceive of rule-following as a 
detached conception. For McDowell, “we need to do interpretation when our 
                                                
4 See Kripke, Saul A. (2004). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An 
Elementary Exposition (Reprinted Edition). Oxford: Blackwell. 
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understanding is functioning” (Cheng 2015, 7). Hence, there is no detachment for 
“we find ourselves always already engaging with the world” (McDowell 1996, 34). For 
McDowell, to understand rule-following, and avoid the paradox, this rule-following 
should be viewed as a result of our inculcation into a practice of, in this instance,  
addition. Thanks to our inculcation into our culture, we become sensitive to reasons, 
which then influence our “habits of thought and action” (McDowell 1996, 85). Hence, 
through this inculcation, we obey a certain rule without detaching from our 
engagement with the world. And, furthermore, to requote Dreyfus, his argument that 
McDowell’s conceptual rationality is akin to the “context-free features that the 
beginner can recognize without previous experience in the domain” (Dreyfus 2005, 
1) is mistaken, for McDowell’s conceptual rationality is not independent of a given 
context, a ‘detached rule-follower’. To uphold Dreyfus' critique of McDowell, then, we 
require a different sort of self-reflection than one which is premised on a detachment. 
 
1.5 The Absorbed Coper  
In “The Return of the Myth of the Mental” (2007, 353) Dreyfus concedes this 
point by McDowell. However, in jettisoning his emphasis on detached, context 
independent rule-following, Dreyfus then progresses to provide a further dichotomy 
of ‘conceptual intentionality’ with ‘involved motor intentionality’ (Dreyfus 2007a, 363). 
Essentially, Dreyfus argues that subjectivity, not detachment, is at issue; as he 
writes, “I should have argued that subjectivity (not detachment) is the lingering ghost 
of the mental […]” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 373), for “[i]n fully absorbed coping, there is no 
immersed ego, not even an implicit one” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 374). Dreyfus further 
quotes Merleau-Ponty, that "to move one's body is to aim at things through it; it is to 
allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any 
representation" (Merleau Ponty 1962, 161). Barbara Montero, both a philosopher 
and previous professional ballet dancer, describes the example of Dreyfus’ 
absorption, that we are at our best, such as in ballet, when we are seamlessly 
moving about our performance, absent of a self-monitoring ego which would just get 
in the way of our motor-intentional action. Montero quotes the choreographer, 
George Balanchine, who would say to his dancers, “Don’t think, dear; just do.” 
(Montero 2013, 303), which she terms as the ‘Just-do-it Principle’, also termed 
Dreyfus’ Principle of Automaticity: 
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When all is going well, expert performance significantly involves neither self-
reflective thinking, nor planning, nor predicting, nor deliberation, nor mental 
effort. (Montero 2013, 304) 
 
Dreyfus employs the examples of the baseball player Chuck Knoblauch and lightning 
chess to lend credence to this absorbed coping, the absence of an ego (Dreyfus 
2007, 354). Chuck Knoblauch, of the New York Yankees, was awarded the Golden 
Glove Award for his ‘expert performance’ on second base. However, one day he 
faltered and began to start “spraying around his throws to first base. He had to be 
moved to left field and his career tailed off” (Papineau 2017). Poor Chuck one day 
simply ‘forgot’ how to ‘just do it’, forgetting how to perform baseball in the flow. As 
Dreyfus wrote, 
 
As second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was so successful 
he was voted best infielder of the year, but one day, rather than simply fielding 
a hit and throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped back and took up 
a “free, distanced orientation” towards the ball and how he was throwing it – to 
the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that, he couldn’t recover his former 
absorption…Interestingly, even after he seemed unable to resist stepping 
back and being mindful, Knoblauch could still play brilliant baseball in difficult 
situations – catching a hard-hit ground ball and throwing it to first faster than 
thought. What he couldn’t do was field an easy routine grounder directly to 
second base, because that gave him time to think before throwing to first. 
(Dreyfus 2007a, 354 – my emphasis)  
 
Chuck’s ego came into play, and his absorbed coping is disrupted, the absorption in 
which his body knew how to do things at its best, absentia subjectivity. He needed to 
empty his mind, so to speak, and go with the flow. Instead, Chuck reverted to clumsy 
self-monitoring, swapping a practical understanding for a conceptual understanding, 
a paralysis by analysis, decoupled from a richer world of affordances that would 
solicit him otherwise in absorption. Hence, Chuck reverted back to mindedness – the 
ego. For Dreyfus, McDowell’s conceptual rationality, the ‘responsiveness to reasons’, 
is flawed, for “the involvement of rationality in human action […] is not a result of 
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adding an ‘I think’ to representations of one’s actions”, for this would cohere to a 
subjective stance towards one’s perceptual experience. On the ‘intra-mundane’ level, 
Dreyfus quotes Heidegger in that: 
 
What is first of all ‘given’ is the ‘for writing,’ the ‘for going in and out,’ […] ‘for 
sitting’. That is, writing, going-in-and-out, sitting, and the like are what wherein 
we a priori move. What we know when ‘we know our way round’ (Heidegger 
1927 quoted in Dreyfus 2013, 17) 
 
In Dreyfus’ other example, of lightning chess, he shows an absorbed activity that we 
could view as more conceptual in nature than to Chuck Knoublach’s motor-
intentional activity. As was the case for Dreyfus’ previous example, there is, in the 
example of the grand-master ‘expert’ chess player, no deliberation or the presence 
of an ego. Rather, “after much experience, the chess master is directly drawn by the 
forces on the board to make a masterful move” (2013,35). Dreyfus & Dreyfus pitted 
Julio Kalpan, an internationally renowned chess master, against a weaker player in a 
game of lightning chess (Dreyfus 1986, 33). During this game, Kaplan was 
presented with mathematical additional sums, and requested to vocally answer as 
rapidly as he could. However, as they reported, “[e]ven with his analytic mind 
completely jammed by adding numbers, Kaplan more than held his own against the 
master in a series of games” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986, 33). This, for Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, indicates “that attending to one’s moves it not important or essential to 
chess expert” (Montero 2016, 214), for, lacking the time to perceive issues and seek 
methods to resolve them, Kaplan still, in Dreyfus’ terminology, produced ‘fluid’ and 
coordinated play. As Dreyfus wrote: 
  
When the Grandmaster is playing lightning chess, as far as he can tell, he is 
simply responding to the patterns on the board. At this speed he must depend 
entirely on perception and not at all on analysis and comparison of 
alternatives. (Dreyfus 2005, 53) 
 
As we have seen, the idea of ‘attention’ focuses heavily on Dreyfus phenomenology 
of absorbed coping, in which self-reflective monitoring is only competent at best or, 
for Chuck, dire at its worst. The expert or master is unreflective. Yet, I cannot agree 
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with Dreyfus’ characterization of McDowell’s claim, as I shall discuss in the next 
section. 
 
1.6 Attention and Perception  
Contrary to Dreyfus, McDowell argues that “distance is not actualized in 
unreflective perceptual experience or in unreflective intentional agency, but 
conceptual capacities are operative in both” (McDowell 2013a, 53). It is true that the 
subject is not in the position whether to judge that things are that way in many 
circumstances in which reflection is not being enacted. However, as McDowell 
further notes, “if a rational subject does not yet have means to make explicit some 
way her experience reveals things to be, it is always possible to equip herself with 
such means” (McDowell 2013a, 43). Hence, making this content explicit does not 
mean that the content is newly conceptual (what one could assume is transformed 
into from the sort of non-conceptuality Dreyfus advocates), for having things received 
into experience in a certain way is already a form of conceptual capacities in 
operation. Rationality, in what McDowell terms as “rationality in the strong sense”, 
permeates action, even in unreflective action such as that of the expert or master. 
McDowell, in “The Myth of the Mind as Detached” (2013), employs the example of a 
rational human and a ‘mere animal’, a dog, catching a frisbee thrown directly to 
them. To quote at length:  
 
[C]onsider catching a flying object. When a rational agent catches a frisbee, 
she is realizing a concept of a thing to do. [. . . O]f, say, catching this. (Think 
of a case in which, as one walks across a park, a frisbee flies towards one, 
and one catches it in the spur of the moment.) When a dog catches a frisbee, 
he is not realizing any practical concept; in the relevant sense, he has none. 
The point of saying that the rational agent, unlike the dog, is realizing a 
concept in doing what she does is that her doing, under a specification that 
captures the content of the practical concept that she is realizing, comes 
within the scope of her practical rationality – even if only in that, if asked why 
she caught the frisbee, she would answer “No particular reason; I just felt like 
it”. (McDowell 2013a, 48-49) 
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In this example, the dog is not realizing any practical concept, any practical 
rationality. However, as strong rationality is pervasive and thus operative even in the 
human being’s unreflective action, the rational human realizes her practical concept; 
she is doing the right thing to do, through her practical experience, a practical 
wisdom. As Benedict Smith notes, “McDowell [...] suggests that mindedness can be 
expressed through practice, not merely translated into action, but realized in action" 
(Smith 2010, 159). However, McDowell proposes that Dreyfus creates a new Myth, 
the ‘Myth of the Mind as Detached’, which distorts the notion of acting for reasons, 
misconstruing McDowell’s own position. For the rational human, when she catches 
the Frisbee, she is “exercising a capacity that belongs to her rationality; she is 
realizing a concept of a thing to do” (McDowell 2013a, 48). Even if the frisbee player 
does not realise the concept of a frisbee, she has another concept of, say, ‘catching 
this’. In acknowledging the question ‘why?’ the frisbee catcher judges appropriately 
that this question was directed to her with regards to her catching the Frisbee. This is 
also to say, then, that she acts intentionally, “she is realizing a concept of a thing to 
do” (McDowell 2013a, 49) by providing a null answer. The human Frisbee catcher, 
then, reflects on her reasons for reacting retroactively. This runs contrary to Dreyfus’ 
assertion that when one steps back, one is stepping back to reflect conceptually, 
removed from a pre-conceptual coping. The operation of conceptual capacities, 
therefore, do not need to be active. Rather, and for the most part in our day to day 
coping and our master or expert performance, these conceptual capacities are 
passive. To read the pervasiveness of conceptuality as always operative is, then, a 
misconstrual of McDowell’s argument. For McDowell, the absorbed coper does not 
have content explicitly in her thought, unless her ‘flow’ is disrupted, but this does not 
mean conceptual rationality is absent. McDowell argues that:  
 
[L]anguage enables us to have experience that […] has content that is 
conceptual in the sense that I have introduced […] No aspect is unnameable, 
but that does not require us to pretend to make sense of an ideal position in 
which we have a name for every aspect, let alone to be in such a position. 
(2007a, 348) 
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A McDowell argues, just as an ‘I think’ in the Kantian sense, encompasses all 
thoughts, that, given the nature of the first-person nature of our experiences, an ‘I do’ 
must always accompany our experiences. To quote McDowell: 
 
Self-awareness in action is practical, not theoretical. It is a master of an ‘I do’ 
rather than an ‘I think”; hence, if we conceive of actions in terms of an ‘I do’ it 
is a “way of registering the essentially first person character of the realization 
of practical rational capacities that acting is (McDowell quoted by Dreyfus 
2013, 28) 
 
As McDowell has stated, in order to not fall into the Myth of the Given, the relevant 
perceptual content of an experience must already be in the right conceptual form in 
order to be received. He writes, “[m]y claim was that the ‘I do’ characterizes the form 
of actions as such” (McDowell 2013a, 46), whether it is reflectively engaged or not; it 
is always the possibility of this ‘I do’ that “characterizes the form of the 
representations of self-conscious subjects […] even representations that do not 
involve explicit thinking” (McDowell 2013a, 46). If we drop Dreyfus’ commitment that 
conceptual rationality, the self-knowledge of reflection must be taken as a disruption 
in egoless absorbed coping, and hence a self in the moment of action, we can see 
the chess master, for instance, as “making his moves in [a] self-consciously rational 
response to the forces on the board” (McDowell 2013a, 49), for the chess master 
can articulate her moves retroactively, for any unreflective action as conceptual in 
the first place. Her movements responding to the forces on the board provides a 
non-null answer to the question of ‘Why did you move that piece?’ (McDowell 1996, 
57). Thus, as McDowell notes, “making the content [explicit] even if the subject first 
has to acquire means to do that […] does not make the content newly conceptual in 
any sense that it is relevant to my claim. It was conceptual already” (2013, 43). As he 
writes, regarding the operation of conceptuality in un-reflective experience “what is 
important is this: if an experience is world disclosing […], all its content is present in 
a form in which […] it is suitable to constitute contents of conceptual capacities” 
(McDowell 2007a).  
But what is it to have a conceptual ‘form’ or ‘shape’? In Mind and World, we 
can read into this shape as being of the sort of propositional content that McDowell 
defines as ‘things are thus and so’, which, as the content of experience, provides a 
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certain determinative structure to the conceptual content.5 However, as a thorough 
all pervasive conceptualist, McDowell still argues that human experience cannot 
have non-conceptual content. Whilst acknowledging the distinction between 
experiences that are conceptually exercised and not exercised, McDowell still views 
these unexercised faculties as conceptually operative. However, is it possible to 
bring forth all the richness of our perceptual experiences, the fine grainedness of 
experience into conceptual capacities? McDowell argues that, making content 
explicit, through retroactively applying the correct articulation via language of it, does 
not mean that the content was non-conceptual to begin with.  
 Yet, as both Dreyfus, in direct response to McDowell, as well as Gareth Evans 
in The Varieties of Reference (1982) have noted, the content of a subject’s 
experience, our perceptual discrimination, is far richer, and hence more finely 
grained, than that which conceptual discrimination can provide us with. As Evans 
queries, “do we really understand the proposal […] that we have as many colour 
concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminate?” (Evans 
1982, 229). These general concepts, applied to colours (i.e. purple52 or purple68) in 
this instance, are insufficient to provide an adequately rich account of our perceptual 
experience of these colours, for the ability to discriminate the determinate shades 
exhausts one’s conceptual capacities. For Evans, there is a non-conceptual content 
that is too finely grained, which is then transformed into conceptual experiential 
content, whereas McDowell argues that experiential content is intrinsically 
conceptual from the get-go.  
                                                
5 However, in the face of criticism by Charles Travis (2013), McDowell 
dropped the requirement for experiences being credited with judgement-
propositional content in the exercise of conceptual capacities, of such ‘that things are 
thus and so’ as being the content of experience. Instead, McDowell tweaked this 
towards the Kantian ‘intuitional’ content of conceptual content experience, as “a form 
in which it is already suitable to be the content associated with a discursive capacity’ 
(McDowell 2009: 264). As he wrote: 
 
I used to assume that to conceive experiences as actualizations of conceptual 
capacities, we would need to credit experiences with propositional content, 
the sort of content judgments have. And I used to assume that the content of 
an experience would need to include everything the experience enables its 
subject to know non-inferentially. But both these assumptions now strike me 
as wrong (McDowell 2008, 3).  
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 Let us consider the perceptual state within the context of the background in 
which you are currently in. Say, the words on this page, the surround of your desk 
and books, the vast array of colours ranging across our visible light spectrum. How 
many words would adequately encapsulate this cacophony of conceptual activity?  
Consider the multitudinous array of experiences pervading one’s perceptual 
experiences currently, such as an almost innumerable amount of colours of whites, 
browns, deeper shades of blue and so on. Can these be exhausted by conceptual 
articulation? Our perceptual experience is presented far more finely grained than 
concepts can articulate. As Andrew Inkpin notes, “McDowell’s argument relies on 
representation via the finite and discretely articulated system of a language – as it 
presumably must in order to preserve an intrinsic connection with reasons and 
rationality.” (Inkpin 2015, 69). Yet, if language preserves the connection between 
reasons and rationality, and colour perception exhausts the conceptual articulation of 
colours, and hence is too fine grained, then there is an element of human experience 
that cannot be conceptually articulated. This inexpressibility of the rich perceptual 
experience of our lives is thus, as stated too fine grained. The conclusion of this 
argument, therefore, is for a claim of the non-conceptualism of perceptual 
experience, as “the content of perceptual states is different in kind from that of 
cognitive states like belief” (Evans 1982, 485), which we can apply to more 
generalized, more coarsely grained, concepts.  
  McDowell, and other conceptualists (Brewer 1999), counter-argue against 
this non-conceptual critique. They argue that one can account for these fine-grained 
concepts by appealing to the concept as being a ‘demonstrative concept’, such as 
‘this shade’ or the “shade that is experienced” (Kelly 2008, 398), instead of the more 
general concepts, susceptible to Evans’ critique. For the rational subject, even if she 
lacks the means to make explicit some aspect of experience that she perceives, has 
the capacity to equip herself with these means: she “has that shade of colour” 
(McDowell 2013a, 43). These demonstrative concepts, contrary to general concepts, 
are articulated through a demonstrative expression that “pick out the way the object 
or property now being experienced is given” (Kelly 2001, 401) in perceptual 
experience. As Sean Kelly notes, these demonstrative concepts are elements of 
thought, for they “figure in expressions that we can entertain in propositional attitude 
context, they are propositions that stand in inferential relations to one another” (Kelly 
2001, 401; Kelly 2005), and are ‘context-dependent’, in the sense that the semantic 
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value changes, depending on the context in which it is applied. McDowell 
acknowledges the threat here, that ‘that thing has that shade’ is a “only a fraudulent 
appearance of expressing a way objects can be, so that one could significantly say 
that the object in question is that way” (McDowell 2013a, 43-44). He responds further 
to this in Mind and World (1996), in that we can recognize demonstrative concepts 
as conceptual activity if the same conceptual capacity that the “very same capacity 
to embrace a colour in mind can in principle persist beyond the duration of the 
experience itself” (McDowell 1996, 57). Hence, after this indication, when holding 
‘this’ shade of colour in mind over x amount of time, we are employing our 
conceptual capacities in a meaningful way, for that shade, after the original 
unreflective/inexpressible perceptual recognition of that colour through the 
demonstrative concept, can be expressed in the concept of a shade. As McDowell 
writes: 
 
[…] what ensures that it is a concept […] is that the associated capacity can 
persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can 
be used also in thoughts about what is by then the past, if only the recent past 
[…] the very same capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in principle 
persist beyond the duration of the experience itself (McDowell 1996, 57) 
 
However, as Inpkin has noted, if the “determinable and demonstrative concepts in 
combination with recognitional capacities suffices to ensure that fineness of grain 
does not succeed in distinguishing something as nonconceptual […] McDowell gives 
no argument of how the shape of the form of content occurs; there is no explanation 
of if the shape was already conceptual in form” (Inkpin 2015, 69). As McDowell has 
stated, employing demonstrative concepts opens up the potential for articulating 
experiences, even when lacking the adequate words which are not available, for we 
“do not need to have words for all the content that is conceptually available to us” 
(McDowell 2007a, 348). Yet, if, as we have seen earlier, McDowell acknowledges 
the distinction between unreflective action and reflection, yet conflates the two as 
both as conceptually operative (and thus sharing what we can call a ‘conceptual 
‘shape’), there needs to be a link between pre-reflection and reflection, even if they 
share the same form and shape, and hence a shared meaning that can be (as 
McDowell would argue) potentially articulable. Yet, without a shared conceptual form 
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between unreflective and reflective conceptual form, the potential for articulation of 
the unreflective form would not exist in the first place. To reiterate, McDowell writes, 
“what is important is this: if an experience is world-disclosing […], all its content is 
present in a form in which […] it is suitable to constitute contents of conceptual 
capacities’” (McDowell 2007b, 319). Hence, when the experience has a world 
disclosure, the content has a distinctive form. Yet, this ‘distinctive form’ requires a 
determinate characteristic to demarcate it from, to employ a colour example, 
purple23 from purple1098. To antecedently apply a conceptual form onto an 
experience does not justify that the concept was intrinsically conceptual in the first 
place; to assert ‘it was conceptual already’ is not enough. As Inkpin notes, this is the 
same kind of argument that Wittgenstein critiques in his Philosophical Investigations, 
in which we could say in an extension of that critique, that McDowell commits the 
fallacy of the “predicating of the thing what lies in the mode of representation” (Inkpin 
2015, 70; Wittgenstein 1953, §104). Unlike our conceptual capacities operative in 
reflection, this responsiveness to reasons is not experienced in unreflective action. 
As Rietveld notes, the consequence of the application of McDowell’s framework 
through which “[…] the subtleties of unreflective human behaviour in context are 
concerned is sometimes like repairing a torn spider’s web with one’s fingers” 
(Rietveld 2010, 186-187).  
 
Conclusion to Chapter One 
Having introduced the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, there have been two key 
elements from both philosophers that I have explored. Dreyfus initially argued that 
McDowell’s conceptual rationality was akin to the form of theoretical rule-following of 
the beginner. However, after points raised regarding McDowell’s own conception of 
rule following – one that was not detached – Dreyfus dropped this argument, instead 
opting for our absorption being mindless, and lacking an ego – the absence of 
subjectivity. But, again, this runs into issues of his critique of McDowell’s conception 
of the operation of conceptual capacities. Whilst Dreyfus claims that there is no 
conceptual rationality in unreflective absorption, McDowell responds that one’s self-
awareness in action (such as catching a Frisbee) is practical, not theoretical. It is a 
master of an ‘I do’ rather than an ‘I think’” (McDowell quoted by Dreyfus 2013, 28). 
However, McDowell appears to be unable to explain the link of conceptual form 
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between that of unreflective and reflective action: how are we involved in the world, 
given the conceptual ‘gap’ between unreflective action and self-reflection? 
Additionally, McDowell’s argument for demonstrative concepts to counter Dreyfus 
and Evans’ critiques regarding the fine-grainedness of colour perception, applying 
the retroactive ‘that shade of colour’, fails to prove that the content was conceptual to 
begin with. To antecedently apply conceptual content to fine grained colours is not a 
strong enough argument to counter the non-conceptualists claim. The argument for a 
(finite amount) of articulable colour concepts being exhausted by the potentially 
limitless number of shades of colour that one can perceptually discriminate seems to 
hold firm against McDowell’s counter-critique. McDowell puts forth the clam that the 
conceptual form is shared in unreflective and reflective action in order to prevent 
conceptual rationality being situation independent, yet, as we have seen, McDowell 
provides no compelling reason for the ‘form’ in unreflective action being conceptual, 
rather than non-conceptual, in the first place. 
In the second chapter I will hone in onto two points of Dreyfus and 
McDowell’s. First, regarding Dreyfus, I analyse his absorbed coping argument, 
questioning the phenomenological underpinnings of the absence of an ego and 
subjectivity in absorption. Second, I follow on from my critique of McDowell’s 
unreflective to reflective action argument by addressing how this link can be 
maintained through an ‘ethical upbringing’, to what McDowell terms the initiation into 
a linguistic culture, the attainment of a natural language, to be truly ‘minded’. I 
contest this, for, given contemporary research into what is termed as a ‘we’ 
intentionality, there is a specifically human capacity for a pre-linguistic, pre-
conceptual group-ish mindedness, even in infant human beings, that McDowell 
would deem proto-subjective, that elude the sort of conceptual, linguistic parameters 
for the human being that McDowell speaks of.  
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Chapter Two 
The Linguistic Community and the Absent Ego 
  
Man is a rational animal — so at least I have been told. Throughout a long life, I have 
looked diligently for evidence in favour of this statement, but so far, I have not had 
the good fortune to come across it. 
- Bertrand Russell  
-  
When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are 
open to the very existence of this tract of the Space of Reasons  
 
- John McDowell 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter regarding the operation of (a shared form 
of) conceptual capacities in unreflective and reflective experience, there is still 
something that needs further exploration. Let us requote McDowell, in that “[f]or the 
initiated person who has acquired a language, this language opens up the potential 
for articulating experiences” (McDowell 2007a, 348 – my emphasis). What exactly 
does it mean to be initiated? McDowell proposes that this initiation is that of the 
initiation of an infant (a pre-conceptual/proto-subjective infant)6 human, acquiring 
their second nature (Bildung) via an ‘ordinary upbringing’ into a ‘linguistic 
community’. This infant, then, acquires a natural language. It is only when one is 
initiated that we are truly minded, because an “ordinary upbringing can shape the 
actions and thoughts of human beings in a way that brings these demands [of the 
operation of conceptual capacities] in view (McDowell 1996, 82). Both infants that 
are not yet initiated into this linguistic community, and non-human animals alike, lack 
McDowell’s strict sense of ‘mindedness’. The human infant, however, has a 
‘potential’. As we can read in Davidson’s notion of language and rationality in his 
chapter “The Rational Animal”: 
 
Neither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant 
survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true 
                                                
6 Let us say for simplicity’s sake, around the eighteen-month mark. 
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of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a 
rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or 
because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, 
there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, between the infant 
and the snail on one hand, and the normal adult person on the other 
(Davidson 1982, 317) 
 
As we have seen in the opening chapter, McDowell employs his conceptual 
rationality claim to reintegrate the link between mind and world. This additionally 
accounts for our richly normatively world, which, as Thomas noted, “is to enjoy the 
full normativity which for McDowell is the essence of mentality” (Thomas 1997, 285 
quoted in Zahavi 2013, 324). However, are there aspects of the human being, such 
as colour perception hitherto discussed, that is too fine-grained for conceptual 
articulation (nor, it appears, can it be described in demonstrative concepts either) 
that appears to elude McDowell’s claim for the all pervasiveness of conceptual 
rationality? I believe so.  
In the first part of Chapter Two, I argue that, given evidence of a pre-linguistic, 
pre-conceptual ‘we’-intentionality and mimetic capacities in both infants and adults 
alike, we can see that the human being, and distinctly the human being, is enriched 
with a normatively structured world prior to the acquisition of a natural language 
which additionally resides in the mature human. In human infants, expression, or 
bringing a ‘world in view’, is not articulated via the medium of a natural language, 
true. However, the world can be brought into view through the understanding and 
enforcement of normative requirements. Hence, whilst these infants may not be 
minded in McDowell’s strict sense, pre-conceptual infants show a mindedness of the 
‘we’. This appears to suggest that there is something distinctively human that may 
also provide the conditions for rationality, without being exhausted by rationality 
itself. 
 I will then address Dreyfus’ phenomenological absorption claim, specifically in 
relation to his ‘mindlessness’ - his absence of an ego in absorbed coping. I query 
how, if the absence of an ego is when we perform at our best, as the baseball player, 
as the driver, as the lecturer, and so on, then how do we ‘step out’ of this absorption 
and into reflection? Dreyfus, evidently, does not denounce our ability for self-
reflection, as evidenced by his articulation of the phrasing of the human being as a 
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‘part-time rational animal’. Proceeding along the argument of Dreyfus’ absent ego, I 
address Dreyfus’ argument for how we distinguish the human being from non-human 
animals. Dreyfus argues that human beings have, in distinction to non-human 
animals, which otherwise we are akin to in our absorption, a ‘mineness’. However, 
this mineness experience is not qualitative; the mineness is of our affordances in our 
given context, rather than a self-acquaintance with the self. Let us recall that Dreyfus 
allows for no monitoring or mindedness during absorption. We are, therefore left with 
a non-qualitative phenomenology. However, I explore and query: what exactly is a 
non-qualitative phenomenology?  
I will conclude Chapter Two by acknowledging that both Dreyfus and 
McDowell have strong points; however, there is an ontological gulf between the two 
philosopher’s claims. Dreyfus and McDowell’s claims, I argue, require a mediation to 
reconcile this gulf between conceptuality and existential phenomenology. I believe 
that this can be remedied through the lens of Helmuth Plessner’s Philosophical 
Anthropology. 
 
2.1 McDowell’s Initiation 
McDowell, as we have seen in the previous chapter, endeavours to reconcile 
mind and world, because, how we avoid the “sensitivity to real demands of reason 
looks spooky, unless we can reconstruct it from materials that are naturalistic in the 
relevant sense”. To do this, we require an “ordinary upbringing [that] can shape the 
actions and thoughts of human beings in a way that brings these demands in view” 
(McDowell, 1996, 82 – my emphasis). McDowell attempts to resolve this issue via a 
generalised Aristotelian naturalism, with a particular focus on Aristotle’s ethics, which 
is a “form of thought which is intrinsically human but which is nevertheless 
responsive to […] demands (Wright 1996, 247). McDowell rests this on the concept 
of the Bildung, that of a second nature (though, outside of McDowell, there are other 
definitions). The ‘ethical’ is a domain of rational requirements which are there in any 
case, whether or not we are responsive to them, for “to feel the force of ethical 
demands is, then, constitutive of the ethical character one acquires through the 
proper ethical training, an ethical character that is therefore a second nature” 
(Forman 2012, 470). McDowell employs this notion for the initiation and attainment 
of conceptual capacities through this ethical upbringing:  
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When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our 
eyes are open to the very existence of this tract of the Space of Reasons. 
Thereafter our appreciation of its detailed layout is indefinitely subject to 
refinement, in reflective scrutiny of our ethical thinking. (McDowell 1994, 82 – 
my emphasis). 
 
 As we can see here, then, this initiation does not just add a rational layer on 
top of proto-subjective experience; rather, it is a comprehensive transformation of 
experience. This initiation is a radical transformation of subjectivity, because under 
ethical considerations, an “ordinary upbringing can shape the actions and thoughts 
of human beings in a way that brings these demands into view”, for the “rational 
demands of ethics are autonomous - they don’t need validation or interpretation from 
outside specifically ethical thinking” (McDowell 1994 83). As stated, this is a 
generalised account of Aristotle's ethical upbringing and that of the practically wise 
person, the phronimos (the agent of phronesis). As Aristotle wrote: 
...although the young may be experts in geometry and mathematics and 
similar branches of knowledge [sophoi], we do not consider that a young man 
can have Prudence [phronimos]. The reason is that Prudence includes a 
knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience, which a 
young man does not possess; for experience is the fruit of years (Aristotle 
1976, 1142a) 
For McDowell, the ethical upbringing, or we can say initiation, of the phronimos 
equips her with embodied conceptual rationality, which is ‘‘not something that 
dictates to one’s nature from the outside’’ (McDowell 2001,192). Both McDowell and 
Dreyfus agree on the phronimos being an example par excellence of human action, 
in which in a given situation, “the unreflective action of this ethical expert somehow 
takes not only all relevant virtues into account (friendship, justice, etc.), but on top of 
that also the right time, the right way of acting, etc., and all this in relation to 
ourselves” (Rietveld 2010, 190). This practical wisdom cannot be expressed 
independently of the context in which phronimos is called to act (McDowell 2007, 
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340)7. However, for McDowell, in this reception of the phronimos of acting sensitively 
to a particular affordance that solicits her, she determines what is relevant to the 
particular situation based on the phronimos’ conception of how to live herself; the 
way of upbringing that moves her to act to the affordance x, rather than y, 
immediately (this can also be seen to harken back to McDowell’s frisbee example in 
the second chapter). Concepts that we have learnt to actively apply to such things as 
beliefs and judgement are drawn passively, then, into operation in lived experience. 
Hence one’s upbringing, through one’s socio-cultural enculturation and learning to be 
‘prudent’, enables “one’s sensitives to kinds of similarities between situations” 
(McDowell 1998, 64). As McDowell writes: 
 
We [should] stop assuming that the virtuous person’s judgement is the result 
of balancing reasons for and against. The view of a situation that he arrives at 
by exercising his sensitivity is one in which some aspect of the situation is 
seen as constituting a reason for acting in some way […] (McDowell, 1998, 
56) 
          
For McDowell, "if we generalise the way Aristotle conceives the moulding of 
ethical character, we arrive at the notion of having one's eyes opened to reasons at 
large by acquiring a second nature" (McDowell 1994, 84). Hence, one does not 
produce a distance between mind and world; rather, the autonomy of the space of 
reasons is contingent on one’s ethical upbringing, which is a thoroughly naturalised 
second nature (Bildung). As Wright summarises the comparisons of Aristotle and 
McDowell’s approaches, they are that “first, ethical judgement is constrained by the 
contingencies of our life; second, that this only needs to be an ordinary, and hence 
not a mysterious process (without becoming ‘spooky’), an ethical education to initiate 
people (infants) into the rational demands of ethics. And thirdly, “that correct ethical 
judgement is ‘essentially within reach’ of our ethical thinking” (Wright 2002, 248),  
 This second nature, an initiation into the space of reasons, then, is something 
humans acquire rather than innately have within the realm of natural causal-law, for 
                                                
7 McDowell agrees with Heidegger’s interpretation of the phronimos, quoting 
Heidegger, in that “it is precisely the achievement of phronesis to disclose the 
[individual] as acting now in the full situation within which he acts” (McDowell 2007, 
340 quoting Heidegger 1962, 101). 
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this initiation is something that is a natural process, given an initiation into a linguistic 
community, in the maturation of human beings. In acquiring our second nature, we 
are initiated into a linguistic community through a “natural language […a] language 
into which human beings are first initiated, [which] serves as a repository of tradition, 
a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what” 
(McDowell 1996, 126). The levy of ‘Rampant Platonism’, the acquisition of 
conceptual capacities, could be seen as a stepping back from the world, but 
McDowell avoids this critique for he stresses that this Bildung is natural through and 
through. This allows us to draw a distinction between the purely perceptual 
receptivity of infants and non-human animals, and the conceptually rational human 
within the space of reasons in a naturalistic concept. Therefore, we can say that the 
space of reasons is natural, but is not reducible down to causal-nomological law. 
These rational demands are autonomous, which means they do not need validation 
or interpretation outside of that which is ethical thinking.  For McDowell, then, the 
ethical upbringing of the practically wise person through the sensibility of the 
phronimos draws the particular concepts into operation:  
    
when faced with a particular situation requiring moral consideration, the 
impact of the particulars on the sensibility of the phronimos draws the relevant 
concepts into operation (Azadpur 2011, 31). 
 
McDowell considers infants distinct to other animals in the sense that they 
have the ‘potential’ to be in the space of reasons; however, McDowell also 
emphasises that the human being remains an animal, for it is not released from its 
environment. However, as Sabina Lovibond notes, “humans alone develop beyond 
the stage of ‘enslavement to immediate biological imperatives’ (Lovibond 2009, 114). 
For humans, actuality (ένέργεια) is prior to potentiality (δύναμις) in “formula and in 
substance; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not” (Aristotle, 1976, 
1049b 11–12). On one hand, everything that exists is caused and rendered 
intelligible by something that precedes it. On the other hand, as Aaron Jaffe notes, a 
“latent potential must itself be temporally prior to what comes to be actual. In the 
temporal register, and applied to humans, this potential would be the form that exists 
in the child before she has acquired conceptual rationality” (Jaffe 2016, 56). Our 
ethical upbringing, therefore, brings us into the space of reasons, hence enabling us 
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to have a particularly human normatively-structured view. As has been alluded to, we 
acquire these abilities to actively apply judgements or beliefs passively into operation 
in our experiences through our maturation, our initiation in which we acquire a 
second nature. This, therefore, allows McDowell to equate mindedness with initiated 
human beings, without causing a disjuncture between the space of reasons and 
space of the natural world, and falling into the Myth of the Given, or rampant 
Platonism. As McDowell writes: 
 
[if] an individual human being is to realize her potential of taking her place in 
that succession, which is the same thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to 
think and act intentionally, at all, the first thing that needs to happen is for her 
to be initiated into a tradition as it stands” (McDowell 1996, 126 - my italics). 
 
Does this constitute mindedness, however? Or is there a limit to this conception of 
conceptual rationality and its joining with mindedness? I believe so. If to be a human 
being with a fully-fledged subjectivity, enabling a richly normatively structured world, 
is to be ‘minded’ through the initiation into a linguistic community (and thus a natural 
language), then we should find that infants, as McDowell argues, lack a richly 
normatively structure to the world, the “ability to think and act intentionally, at all” 
(McDowell 1996, 126). In accordance with McDowell, these infants are 
indistinguishable from the proto-subjectivity of non-human animals, barring 
potentiality. Is this so? Perhaps not. Whilst infants may lack an apperceptive ‘I’ as 
defined by McDowell, via the initiation into a linguistic community, they still have a 
distinctively human, and only human, capacity for a ‘we intentionality’ and a mimetic 
capacity, a social-cognitive and specifically human trait, that appears in infants at a 
younger age than that in which language acquisition, and hence earlier than when 
McDowell’s sense of ‘mindedness’, develops.  
 
2.2 The Pre-Linguistic Community 
The developmental psychologist, Michael Tomasello, has shown that the 
human being, even at the pre-linguistic age of below eighteen months, is distinct 
from other animals, in that we can imitate others, share attention with others, and 
understand that other humans have their own intentionality. Humans are a part of an 
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intersubjective, cooperative communication community. As he writes, “human 
cooperative communication is more complex than ape intentional communication, 
[…its] underlying social-cognitive infrastructure comprises not only skills for 
understanding individual intentionality but also skills and motivations for shared 
intentionality” (Tomasello 2010, 321). On this view, non-human animals we can say 
live in a bio-social environment, whilst humans live in a socio-cultural environment; a 
distinction between non-human animals of spontaneously joining in to an activity, 
and the genuine imitation of behaviour found in humans. For example, a non-human 
primate does not reflect or reason upon a pointing gesture, nor asks why someone 
else is pointing, for it is an imperative, a ‘go and get that for me’. However, whilst the 
notion of pointing to provide information in response to a want or desire is absent in 
non-human primates, it is very much apparent in human pre-linguistic infants (Moss 
2013). Tomasello, in one study on infants, assessed, on the first test round, an 
experiment between an infant and adult’s expectations, comparing normative 
requirements (Tomasello 2008, 92-93, 321). In the first round, the infant passively 
observes an adult place magazines in a cabinet. On the second round, the adult 
expresses trouble opening a door because of carrying the handful of magazines. 
Intriguingly, in the third round, the infant anticipated what would happen, attempting 
to open the door for the adult in advance, showing where the magazines should be 
placed. As we can see, in this third round, the infant leads the way in this exercise, 
showing where the adult should put the magazines away before opening the door. 
This is an enforcement of normative rules. As Tomasello noted, 
 
The child and adult develop mutual expectations about one another’s 
behaviour […] the child ends up structuring the activity and even 
communicating to the adult something like “They go there”, meaning that in 
this activity, certain tasks are performed according to normative requirements. 
(Tomasello 2008, 93) 
 
To stress, the infant is still in the ‘babble’ stage, and unable to employ the type of 
linguistic capacity that McDowell argues is the same as ‘mindedness’ via the 
attainment of a natural language. Yet, these very same infants are capable of a 
collaborative activity with an adult, for they “conclude that this is how it is done, this 
is how ‘we’ do it” (Tomasello 2008, 93). Contrary to McDowell’s argument that the 
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‘minded’ initiated are those “who are in charge of their thinking, standing ready to 
reassess what is a reason for what, and to change their responsive propensities 
accordingly” (McDowell 1996, 50), the pre-initiated infants have a normatively 
structured world, the sociocultural world, which “antedates any substantial skills with 
a conventional language" (Tomasello 2008, 323), thereby antedating an initiation in 
to McDowell’s linguistic community. This suggests that this is a distinctly human pre-
requisite for language in the first place. These pre-initiated infants can enforce 
normative requirements and direct behaviour, suggesting the ‘reason for what’ 
eludes a strictly rational claim. Hence, infants, differentiated from non-human 
animals, by what Tomasello terms their ‘we-intentionality’, appear to have a form of 
mindedness of a ‘we’, a normatively rich world of intersubjectivity. Linguistic based 
mindedness in McDowell’s human being is an insufficient account. On the contrary, 
as shown, pre-linguistic infants, and their ‘we-intentionality’, exhibit a form of 
mindedness that eludes both non-human animals and that of language or rationality. 
As Shaun Gallagher writes, commenting on the intersubjective dimension of infants, 
resonating with my hitherto argument for Tomasello’s ‘we’: 
 
Just these kinds of activities, which seem basic, not only for understanding 
and imitating others, but for learning how to act and how to feel about that 
action, and thus for the embodied and social acquisition of practical reason, 
do not disappear in later development, but remain active and are enhanced 
across the variety of human intersubjective social experiences (Gallagher 
2007, 209 – my emphasis).  
 
McDowell’s linguistic community displays a weakness, because a natural 
language is preceded by a distinctly human shared pre-linguistic world. This shared 
background of non-linguistic practices, the normatively structured ‘we-intentionality’ 
of pre-linguistic infants, enables the shared practices through which aspects of the 
world can be displayed. Language, then, in of itself, renders us “more and more 
remote from the immediate context (Olsen 2013, 67)”, if we situate our analysis of 
infants under McDowell’s strict lens of mindedness. As Olsen comments, on the 
contrary for Dreyfus, “linguistic expression […] never itself helps to structurally 
articulate the ‘referential whole’ or our background familiarity and understanding of 
things” (Olsen 2013, 67). Based on his reading of into Heidegger’s notion of Das 
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Man or ‘The One’, (as in, ‘what one ought to do’) Dreyfus’ analyses 1970’s Japanese 
and American cultures. Dreyfus notes the different cultures and their attributes that 
manifest in the children brought up in that culture, providing a normative structure, a 
distinct culture that manifests pre-linguistically via motor-intentional practices and 
imitation. As the “infants develop, American mothers encourage passionate 
gesturing and vocalising, while Japanese mothers are much more soothing and 
mollifying” (Dreyfus 2017, 47). This provides a culturally specific normative structure 
for the infant, in which American infants develop to be more aggressive; whilst 
Japanese infants develop to be more passive with a “sensitivity to harmony” (Dreyfus 
2005, 4). This enculturement continues throughout life, with culture providing a 
background to our daily practices and ways of being, for “what constitutes the 
American baby as an American baby is its cultural style, and what constitutes the 
Japanese baby as a Japanese baby is its quite different cultural style” (Dreyfus 
2005, 4). We have another form of second nature, according to Dreyfus, a cultural 
second nature, which does not entail conceptual rationality via an initiation into a 
linguistic community, yet is still distinctly human, for “such a pervasive and always 
operative ontological “second nature” opens a space of meaning that governs all 
forms of cultural coping” (Dreyfus 2013, 25).  
To add a further argument against McDowell’s linguistic community 
‘mindedness’, we can see in the work of Merlin Donald (1993; 2001) the 
intersubjectivity of cognitive communities of human beings, a ‘we’-community, which 
has its cognition shaped “by the demands of a communicative universe that was 
much larger than one contained inside a single brain and was instead provided by a 
community of brains”, in which the “human cognitive was increasingly tethered to 
culture” (Donald 2001, 253-259). This all seems concordant with McDowell’s idea of 
the linguistic Bildung, for we could argue that this communicative universe provides 
the appropriate upbringing of the proto-subjective infant into the linguistic community 
to be fully minded. However, Donald introduces the concept of ‘mimesis’. This 
“mimetic capacity produces a layer of cultural interaction that is based entirely on a 
collective web of conventional, expressive nonverbal actions.” (Donald 2001, 265). 
Mimetic skill is an important pre-requisite for language (both in the present and 
evolutionarily), Donald argues, in the symbolically structured sense, as the social 
organization of shared custom, shared attention and expression continued to 
become increasingly complex, in which mimetically intended expression would have 
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had an adaptive advantage which “created conditions that would have favoured a 
communication device of greater speed and power” (Donald 1993, 742). Therefore, 
Donald proposes, the pre-conditions of mimetic skill provided the fundamental level 
principles of highly complex symbolical speech to be possible, the “higher apparatus 
of speech depends on the basically mimetic ability of individuals to create 
rehearsable and retrievable vocal acts […] language per se is layered on top of a 
mimetically skilled phonological system” (Donald 1993, 742 – my emphasis). For 
example, Donald employs studies of infants babbling in sign language environments. 
These infants who are deaf, growing up in a signing environment, mimed the motor 
principles behind signing, rather than the signs themselves; their “manual babbling” 
(Donald 1993, 743) reflecting the response, on the mimetic level, of repetitive motor 
actions. This manual or oral babbling, absent of reference in the linguistic sense, are 
representational in that the babbling patterns in response to their environment 
become not only just the elementary units of language, but the larger “mimetic 
envelope of expression” (Donald 1993, 743). What Donald posits can be compared 
with that of kind of motor-intentional action that we can see in Dreyfus’ sociocultural 
dimension of Das Man; practices of ‘waiting one’s turn’ when speaking, intonation of 
expression in response to another’s, and so on. Because this babbling, then, is free 
of linguistic symbolic reference, this appears to suggest, as Donald notes, that this 
mimetic adaptation evolved first, with linguistic symbolic reference, built upon the 
broader mimetic envelope, developing as a specialized subcategory of this mimetic 
skill. Donald termed this development as the ‘mimetic phase’, which, as have seen, 
is “[…] a layer of cultural interaction that is based entirely on a collective web of 
conventional, expressive nonverbal actions. Mimetic culture is the murky realm of 
eye contact, facial expressions, poses, attitude, body language, self-decoration, 
gesticulation, and tones of voice” (Donald 2001, 265). It is, to Donald, what 
“underlies all modern cultures and forms the most basic medium of human 
communication” (Donald 2001, 271). The ‘cognitive core’ of this mimesis is that of 
kinematic imagination, which is the basis of “conscious review and rehearsal, which 
are central to mimetic action” (Donald 2001, 271 – my emphasis), which involves a 
sequence of operations. First, the action is generated; second, one observes the 
consequences; third, one remembers them; fourth, one proceeds to review the initial 
action through one’s imagination and, finally, one then generates this action again, 
altered by the review. Hence, action that is generated is under constant review, in 
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which each renewal of the cycle of the action is intended to avoid the negative 
impacts of the previous actions – refining them. This, again, suggests there is a 
distinctively human capacity that eludes and preludes McDowell’s rationality. 
Because McDowell limits mindedness, and hence the human being, to her initiation 
into a linguistic community, I propose that he fails to address the pre-linguistic 
mimetic skills that predominate the mindedness of the ‘we’ in both infant and adult.  
In the afterword to Mind and World McDowell acknowledges the need for a 
transitional account that puts non-human animals on a spectrum with the human 
adult in that “we are animals too, not beings with a foothold outside the animal 
kingdom […] [i]f someone wants to work out a conception of orientation towards that 
[which would make] the language of world-directedness available for talking about 
the mentality of brutes, that is, so far, perfectly all right” (McDowell 1996, 183). 
Lovibond notes that to situate ‘spontaneity’ in a naturalistic setting, to acknowledge 
that human beings had evolved and hence have features taken up by a Hegelian 
process is that which “converts successive quantitative changes into a qualitative 
one, into a form of life marked by this unique new attribute of a second nature […] a 
store of historically accumulated [and hence culturally informed wisdom] about what 
is a reason for what” (Lovibond 2009, 120). Now, as I have displayed earlier and, let 
us restate, in relation to infant we-intentionality in which certain tasks are performed 
according to normative requirements; one could argue that we see no issue with 
McDowell and we-intentionality, closeness and mimesis, for they all share normative 
requirements such as the normative enforcement by infants and so on. However, the 
emphasis must be made that these specifically human traits are provided on a pre-
linguistic, pre-conceptual background and are, hence, not via an initiation into a 
linguistic community. I would suggest, then, that McDowell does not go far enough 
by restricting mindedness to the attainment of a natural language. In the absence of 
a pre-conceptual, pre-linguistic account of the human being, we are left with an 
incomplete account of the human being, left with an Absent We.  
 
2.3 Dreyfus’ Absent Ego 
Let us return to Dreyfus’ absorbed coping claim, in which, as stated, we only 
apply an ‘I think’, self-conscious reflection, back onto the subject when pulled out of 
our absorbed coping. However, if in absorption there is no self-monitoring and no 
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ego, then how do we have a sense of individuation and ownership of ourselves? 
Dreyfus responds that we can see our individuation via the context of one’s own 
particular way of being-in-the-world, say as a student or a musician, a ‘mineness’. In 
his reading of Heidegger and mineness, Dreyfus writes: 
 
My mineness cannot be like my private feelings such as my headache, the 
kinaesthetic feeling of moving my body, or some private sense of who I am. 
For Heidegger, Dasein's mineness is the public stand it takes on itself--on 
what it is to be this Dasein-by way of its comportment (Dreyfus 1991, 20).   
 
Therefore, Dreyfus’ mineness has no ‘private feeling’ or ‘private sense of who I am’, 
as it is in the state of absorption, egoless. Yet, as Dan Zahavi points out, “Dreyfus 
insists that this [mineness] has nothing to do with the presence of some form of 
(even marginal) self-awareness. In fact, Dreyfus opts for what might be called a non-
experiential reading of ‘mineness’” (2013). As we have seen, Dreyfus sees any form 
of self-monitoring as incongruous to absorbed coping, as being incompatible with 
obtaining a maximum ‘grip’ on the world and, as is evident in the works of Dreyfus, 
Heidegger’s phenomenology plays a critical role in this conception of absorption. So, 
if the embodied coping of the agent and world collapses, in which, at the ground 
level we are directly merged into a field of ‘attractive and repulsive forces’, there is 
hence no phenomenology of embodied coping in which there is intentional content 
that mediates between mind and world (Dreyfus 2013, 28). As Dreyfus notes, 
quoting Merleau-Ponty: 
 
The orator does not think before speaking, nor even whilst speaking; his 
speech is his thought. The end of the speech or text will be the lifting of a 
spell. It is at this stage that thoughts on the speech or text will be able to arise 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 209).  
 
In these kinds of scenarios of the absorbed coper it is only this embodied 
background coping that supports the foreground/top floor conceptuality of McDowell. 
As Dreyfus notes, in McDowell’s ‘pervasiveness of conceptual rationality’ claim, he 
moves “from the reasonable claim that attentive experience with its attendant ego 
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is sometimes exercised” to mindedness in the strongest sense in that “that this 
capacity is always operative” (Dreyfus 2007b, 376).  
 However, as we have seen previously with Dreyfus’ account of skill 
acquisition (and later motor-intentional absorption and mindlessness), this expert 
(and absorbed) coping is done “without calculating and comparing alternatives […] 
what must be done, simply is done” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986, 253). In attributing an 
‘I do’ to our experiences, Dreyfus argues that McDowell distances the subject from 
the world, akin to a Cartesian split. Dreyfus assumes that McDowell’s conceptual 
rationality is equatable to the rule following of the beginner skilful coper or self-
monitoring ego. Dreyfus argues that, in our master or everyday embodied coping we 
are solicited, as William Gibson proposed, by “affordances” (Gibson 1977, 66; 1979), 
which offers the performative possibility of some given activity. These solicitations 
we need not be aware of, for the object that offers affordances, as Heidegger terms 
it, ‘withdraws’. We are directly drawn by the solicitation, without having to go through 
a conceptual-detour to it, in order to achieve our ‘optimal grip’ on the situation, for as 
Dreyfus remarks, “it would be a pun to think that realising practical capacities in my 
coping requires that I realise what I am doing” (Dreyfus 2013, 29). This is a “zone of 
openness and of presence [...] that is intra-mundane instead of intra-mental” 
(Olafson 2015, 96). Crucially, there is no self-monitoring when absorbed, just the 
solicitation, for “in fully absorbed coping, mind and world cannot be separated […] 
we are directly merged into a field of attractive and repulsive forces” (Dreyfus 2013, 
27-28). The presence of an ‘I do’ is not concordant with the phenomenology of our 
embodied coping8 for no ego is present. For Dreyfus, however, though there is no 
operative pervasive capacity of experience of the ‘I do’ in embodied coping, because 
“[w]hen Dasein is totally merged with the world there is no place for content, neither 
experiential nor propositional” (Dreyfus 2013, 29). This is what we could say to be 
the context of the solicitations that afford us and our way of being, as Dasein is 
characterized by a being whose Being is an issue for it. For Dreyfus, then, each 
person’s life “is pervaded by a certain style of stand on its own being, ‘mineness’” 
(Dreyfus 2013, 30 – my emphasis), rather than ‘I do’ in McDowell’s sense. 
Heidegger, on Dreyfus’ reading, does not see Dasein as having a passive ego in 
embodied coping,  
                                                
8 Dreyfus makes it clear this is not in relation to deliberative action (2013, 29), 
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For example, when I respond to my chair by sitting in it, it is not just my chair 
that solicits sitting. Rather, it is my chair at the table where my computer is 
with my books scattered around it. My coping skills are also taking account of 
the time (a time for work), the ambient lighting (sufficient for work), and the 
whole room (nothing wrong that would disturb work). My world is thus 
pervaded by the style of hard work. Only what enters my world, either by 
helping me work or by getting in the way of my work, counts for me. (Dreyfus 
2013, 30 – Dreyfus’ emphasis).   
         
 But what is it that distinguishes humans from other animals if we are to 
account for the richly, normatively structured lives of the human being? As hitherto 
noted, Dreyfus responds that “[…] even though there need be no ‘I” in my experience 
of coping, my activities as opposed to that of nonhuman animals is pervaded by 
‘mineness’ (2013, 30). An instant response to Dreyfus’ phenomenology of mineness, 
would be the question of how can we speak of a phenomenology in which the ego, 
the experience of experiencing, is not operative and hence not qualitative? As 
Zahavi notes, “Dreyfus insists that this [mineness] has nothing to do with the 
presence of some form of (even marginal) self-awareness” (Zahavi 2013, f64). 
Hence, Dreyfus leans heavily on Heidegger’s reading of mineness to show that, 
even in the absence of an ego, one has a sense of mineness of self through the 
particular and individual context of Dasein.  
 What is a phenomenology defined by the absence of an ego? As Zahavi also 
queries, “how can one speak meaningfully of a phenomenology of mindless coping 
[…] if the coping is completely unconscious?” (Zahavi 2013, 321-322). Perhaps it 
depends on the sort of phenomenology that we have in mind. For example, Daniel 
Dennett’s heterophenomenology, which is the third person scientific method applied 
to consciousness, in which “nothing other than the scientific method [is] applied to 
the phenomena of consciousness” (Dennett 1993, 50). It works as “the bridge 
between the subjectivity of human consciousness and the natural sciences.” 
(Dennett 2007, 249). The subject’s utterances, which are “the raw, uninterpreted 
data” (Dennett 2003, 21), are conveyed to the heterophenomenologist, and the 
subject’s utterances are translated to beliefs. In treating intentional states as beliefs, 
which have a truth value, and hence can be either true or false, these intentional 
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experiences are treated in the third person and can be compiled into a ‘catalogue’ of 
beliefs. Dennett makes the point that rather than philosophical zombies existing in a 
possible world, we are all zombies already in this world. To Dennett, we are absent 
of the ‘what it is like’ experience of consciousness. As Dreyfus & Kelly note, 
Dennett’s “motive as a behaviourist is clear since, once he converts all subjective 
experience into beliefs, he can then argue that beliefs are not mental content but are 
interpreted as such by the intentional stance” (2007, 48). Intentional experience is 
treated as a useful fictional abstraction, resulting in a third person ontology of 
consciousness and intentional irrealism, which, handsomely covers the ground – all 
the ground – of human consciousness, doing justice to all the data...” (Dennett 2003, 
19 – my italics). To continue: 
 
You are not authoritative about what is happening to you, but only about what 
seems to be happening to you, and we are giving you total, dictorial authority 
over the account of how it seems to you, about what it is like to be you 
(Dennett 1991, 84 — my italics) 
 
Perhaps Dreyfus and Kelly are employing a form of Dennett’s heterophenomenology 
in absorbed coping as Zahavi suggests (2013, 322)? Yet, Dreyfus & Kelly addressed 
Dennett’s heterphenomenology in their co-authored paper, “Heterophenomenology, 
Heavy Handed Sleight of Hand” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007). For Dreyfus & Kelly, 
Dennett both under and over-generates intentionality. As we have seen hitherto in 
Dreyfus’ absorbed coping, instead of a mindedness, in which we step back to reflect, 
our primordial way of being is absorbed coping, in which there is not the experience 
of belief, “just the solicitation” (Dreyfus & Kelly 2007, 54). Attributing beliefs, 
therefore, as the heterophenomenologist does, only results in the under-generation 
of intentionality, neglecting and over-looking the motor-intentional primordial way of 
being of the skilful coper (Dreyfus & Kelly 2007, 48). For Dreyfus, there are other 
modes of experience beyond belief: that of an absorbed coping. As Dreyfus writes, 
our Being-in-the-World and our openness to it allows for the “capacity to step back 
and criticize any particular proposition about what is the case and any reason for 
one’s actions” (Dreyfus 2013, 22). Dreyfus (2006, 43-49; Dreyfus & Wrathall 2014, 
117) appeals to a quote by Merleau-Ponty that "in perception we do not think the 
object and we do not think ourselves thinking it, we are given over to the object and 
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we merge into this body which is better informed than we are about the world, and 
about motives we have and means at our disposal” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 277) in 
what Merleau-Ponty refers to as being a part of the world (1962; 1968). Yet, how do 
we, so to speak, ‘step back’ into reflection, if this merging into the body ‘is better 
informed than we are about the world’? Dreyfus writes: 
 
Of course, the coping going on is mine in the sense that the coping can be 
interrupted at any moment by a transformation that results in an experience of 
stepping back from the flow of current coping. I then retrospectively attach an 
“I think” to the coping and take responsibility for my actions. 20 (Dreyfus 
2007a, p. 356). 
 
Yet, as Maarten Coolen queries, “what kind of experience would force humans to 
give up their being absorbed in responding to solicitations that stem from 
affordances they come across in their world?” (Coolen 2014, 190). If no ego is 
present, and hence no experience is present in our absorbed coping, then how do 
we ‘step out’ and detach into reflection? If there is nothing there in the first place, 
given the complete absence of self-monitoring and an ego in absorption, it almost 
seems like phenomenological alchemy to postulate an ego, an ‘I think’, that appears 
once one steps back to take responsibility for one’s actions a ‘something from 
nothing’. This, McDowell levies against Dreyfus as ‘The Myth of the Disembodied 
Intellect’ (2012) for, as he remarks, “[o]nce I have separated me—the thinking thing I 
am—from this body, it is too late to try to fix things by talking about the former 
merging into the latter” (McDowell 2012, 350). In distancing himself from McDowell’s 
conceptual rationality, Dreyfus falls back into the pitfalls of Cartesianism by 
separating the mind from body. It gets worse, however, for as Jonardon Ganeri 
raises, this distinction between the egoless absorption and conceptual intentionality 
results into a return of the Myth of the Given, “creating an unbridgeable gulf between 
the mindlessness of motor intentionality and the fully propositional articulation of 
conceptual and linguistic structure" (Ganeri 2017, 88). 
 The question returns, then: can Dreyfus speak meaningfully of experience, 
particularly qualitative experience - a qualitative phenomenology - when the 
affordances offered solicited a Dasein is absent of qualitative experiential 
awareness? For Dreyfus, there is “just the solicitation” (Dreyfus & Kelly 2007, 54) in 
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experience, in which affordances “draw activity out of us only in the circumstances in 
which we are not paying attention to the activity they solicit” (Dreyfus & Kelly 2007, 
52). If mindedness is the ‘enemy’ of absorbed coping (Dreyfus 2007, 353), then how 
do we speak qualitatively about a phenomenology if we are not paying attention to 
the activity that solicits us. However, as Zahavi notes, a mindedness that permeates 
even in absorption is not necessarily antithetical to Dreyfus’ phenomenology. For 
instance, under Heidegger’s conception of mineness, one is “always somehow 
acquainted with myself” (Heidegger 1962, 251) experiencing one’s experiences as 
my experiences. When experiencing something, one’s self is still present, there is an 
apperceptive element to one’s experiences, even when absorbed, an ‘I do’ is 
experienced qualitatively. Hence, a directness towards an affordance, for instance, is 
“not to be understood as an intentional experience that only gains a reference to the 
self afterwards” (Zahavi 2013, 327) as would be the case in Dreyfus’ disruption into 
self-reflection. Rather, the self discloses itself in its directedness, as “[…] every 
experiencing is characterised by the fact that “I am always ‘somehow acquainted 
with myself’” (Heidegger 1962, 251). So, for Heidegger, the sense of mineness is an 
experience of being acquainted with oneself - a qualitative experience, even when 
‘absorbed’ in the flow. There is always a self-acquaintance with oneself, even 
minimally, thereby implying a minimal sense of self which still experiences 
qualitatively, rather than automatically. Dreyfus refers to a quote by Sartre, 
illustrating the absence of an ‘I’ or ego when ‘plunged into the world of objects’: 
 
When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in 
contemplating a portrait, there is no I. . . . I am then plunged into the world of 
objects . . . it is they which present themselves . . . with attractive and 
repellent qualities -- but me, I have disappeared (Sartre 1957) 
 
Dreyfus, attempts to explain the ‘stepping back’ from this situation of Sartre’s absent 
‘I’, in what he even concedes is a “very sketchy” explanation of the transition from 
absorbed coping to reflection via a gradual disruption in our absorbed activities, “a 
gradual changeover from absorbed coping […] that requires a reflective ego in order 
to take stock of and adjust the situation so as to allow re-immersion into mindless 
coping” (Olsen 2013, 137). But, if mindless coping is an egoless non-qualitative 
experience in which the mineness is only the particular context of a specific Dasein, 
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in how we obtain our optimal grip on the world, it seems superfluous to have a 
reflective ego added on top if this is how we perform when we are at our best. This 
suggests, then, that Dreyfus’ absent ego is inadequate to account for the richness of 
the human being. Additionally,, Zahavi (2013, 327) contradicts Dreyfus’ argument 
premised on Sartre’s work. Zahavi quotes the work of Sartre’s later works, in which 
he writes that through “this self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new 
consciousness, but at the only mode of existence which is possible for a 
consciousness of something [...] consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same 
notion of self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness" 
(Sartre 1956, 76). Under this reading, then, we can see that only a being with this 
sense of qualitative mineness is able “to form concepts about herself, consider her 
own aims, ideals, and aspirations as her own, construct stories about herself, and 
plan and execute actions for which she will take responsibility” (Gallagher & Zahavi 
2005 quoted in Fuchs 2014, 273). This thereby allows for a qualitative 
phenomenology, and additionally enabling ‘something’ to step back, rather than the 
absence of an ego altogether. This, therefore, suggests a need for an account of the 
human being in which she is concordant with Dreyfus’ ‘flow’, whilst also being able to 
step back in to reflection.  
  
Conclusion to Chapter Two 
It appears that we are left at an impasse between Dreyfus’ ‘part-time rational’ 
absorbed coper, and McDowell’s conceptual rationality. As Dreyfus himself 
conceded: 
 
It seems that the conceptualists can’t give an account of how we are involved 
in the world, while the phenomenologists can’t give an account for what 
makes it possible for us to step back and observe it (Dreyfus 2007b, 364) 
 
Dreyfus, as we have seen, cannot explain how human beings, in distinction to non-
human animals, can step out of our absorbed coping into reflection. Humans “have 
the capability of distance themselves from the world they inhabit […] adopting an 
attitude in which they can distinguish objective features in their background” (Coolen 
2014, 112), and this is something that is neglected from Dreyfus’ absorption claim. 
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As Coolen notes, we are “in need of a philosophical account of how human 
embodiment differs radically from the animal way of being embodied (Coolen 2014, 
123), for Dreyfus, in his own words, “owes an account of how our involved, situated 
experience comes to be transformed so that we experience context-free self-
sufficient substances with detachable properties – McDowell’s world of facts, 
features and data. Merleau-Ponty promised what he called the genesis of objective 
truth, but he never produced one. (Dreyfus 2007b, 364). On the other side of the 
debate, McDowell in his claim for the initiation of infants into a linguistic Bildung, 
does not address the pre-linguistic ‘we’ of infants and adults alike and the mimetic 
pre-conditions for rationality and language. Conceptual rationality does not exhaust 
subjectivity or mindedness. Given this account that situates mindedness before 
language, McDowell cannot explain what enables us to ‘step in’. Furthermore, given 
the issues between the sharing of conceptual form link between unreflective action 
and reflection, we are faced, again, with an issue of how to explain how we ‘step in’ 
to the world. Therefore, echoing Zahavi, we need “an alternative and better 
understanding of what experience and subjectivity amount to” (Zahavi 2013, 334). It 
seems that what is required is we need to further refine the human being in light of 
Dreyfus and McDowell’s separate claims, for, to echo Coolen, “we have to find an 
answer to these questions without falling prey to the fallacy of taking humans as 
animals whose essential feature is a mental capacity to reflect” (2014, 123).  
In the next chapter I will provide a synchronic, phenomenological account of 
the human being, through the philosophical anthropologist, Helmuth Plessner’s, 
notion of ‘eccentric positionality’. To be a ‘person’, Plessner argues, is to have an 
eccentric positionality, where one is modulating between being the lived body and 
the body-as-object. Under this ‘eccentric’ analysis, I will re-address some of the 
hitherto issues that were encountered with Dreyfus and McDowell. Additionally, 
employing psychopathological analysis of the experiences of people with 
schizophrenia, I intend to illustrate Plessner’s eccentric positionality through an 
analysis of its fragility that can be reflected by Dreyfus and McDowell’s claims, 
showing that a reconciliation can be made between the two philosophers that better 
captures the richness of the human being. 
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Chapter Three 
Dreyfus-McDowell and Human Eccentricity 
 
Ever since the awakening of my philosophical thinking, the question “what is the 
human being and what is his place in being?” has occupied me more fundamentally 
than any other question I have dealt with. 
- Max Scheler 
-  
I looked just like every other child, but inside I was different. It is as if I am another 
creature that somehow ended up inside a human body 
 
- Anon. Person with Schizophrenia 
 
Let us begin this final chapter by returning to Dreyfus’ concession: 
 
It seems that the conceptualists can’t give an account of how we are 
involved in the world, while the phenomenologists can’t give an 
account for what makes it possible for us to step back and observe it 
(Dreyfus 2007a, 364) 
 
Now, given this impasse, the ‘ontological gulf’ between the conceptual rationality of 
McDowell, and the existential phenomenology of Dreyfus, it would seem appropriate 
to try and find a way to mediate between these two claims. Both have a point. 
However, we still need to explain why, as an animal amongst other animals, we have 
the unique privilege of stepping in and stepping out of the world. Hubert Dreyfus 
cannot explain how, in absorption, one ‘steps back’ into reflection. John McDowell is 
required to explain elements that elude his conceptual rationality, such as, first, the 
pre-linguistic ‘we’-intentionality of infants; second, Donald’s mimetic capacity that 
underlies human experience; and, lastly, elements of experience, such as the fine-
grainedness of colour perception that elude both general concepts and 
demonstrative concepts. Where do we look for this reconciliation? As Lenny Moss 
notes, "[w]hat this dialogue between a 'conceptualist' and a phenomenologist has 
exposed but [has] not been able to resolve is exactly the fundamental question of 
philosophical anthropology. How as an animal amongst other animals, and yet 
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distinguished from other animals, are we built differently?" (Moss n.d: 1). Dreyfus 
and McDowell have not resolved the question of what is the human being. In this 
third chapter, I will introduce the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner. For 
Plessner, rather than a human being being the rational animal or the absorbed 
coper, she instead is a combination of both: she has an ‘eccentric positionality’. In 
this eccentric positionality, the human being is continuously modulating between the 
lived body (Leib) and the body-as-object (Körper). Her eccentric positionality is the 
perspective from which she is both. Plessner argues that due to our eccentricity, 
differentiating ourselves from non-human animals, “[t]he nature of human beings is 
from the very beginning an artificial one” (Plessner GSV, 310). Our artificiality is 
mediated via culture, the Mitwelt of the ‘I’ and ‘we’. I propose that, through an 
analysis of Dreyfus’ issue of a non-qualitative phenomenology, and the equating of it 
with over-emphasising the lived body, and, additionally, given an analysis 
McDowell’s non-exhaustive account of rationality, we can see that both philosophers 
fail to mediate the balance of the human being required in Plessner’s eccentric 
positionality. In the latter half of this chapter, having proposed a synchronic account 
of the human being via Plessner, I aim to show that the vulnerabilities of 
personhood, and hence the fragility of eccentric positionality, can be seen through a 
psychopathological analysis of people with schizophrenia. This fragility of eccentricity 
additionality illuminates the issues of the non-qualitative phenomenology of Dreyfus 
and the absent ‘we’ of McDowell which are reflected in the psychopathology of 
people with this disorder. 
 
3.1 Helmuth Plessner’s Eccentric Positionality. 
Helmuth Plessner (1928; 1941 1963; 1967; 1970) critiqued his contemporary 
existential phenomenologists9, by arguing that, in their fierce opposition to 
Cartesianism (sans Husserl), they miss the fact that we are both beings that are a 
body and also have a body: an inner and outer. For the phenomenologist, 
however,“the cleft between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ does not appear at all” (Plessner 1928, 
                                                
9 One would assume that this would be primarily in relation to Martin Heidegger’s Being and 
Time due to its proximity of publication with Plessner’s own works, for there is little 
evidence of direct engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s works, despite, on the converse, 
Merleau-Ponty alluding to Plessner’s work (see Coolen 2014). One would also presume that 
this would not be in relation to Edmund Husserl, given his own form of Cartesianism. 
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30-31). Plessner’s unique perspective is that all living beings are characterised by 
forming boundaries (Grenze) and by the crossing of these boundaries 
(Grenzverkehr). Living beings have a specific relationship to their boundary, what is 
termed a ‘positionality’. A living beings’ positionality has a link to both sides of its 
boundary, the inner and the outer which is termed as a ‘double aspectivity’ 
(Doppelaspektivität) (Plessner 1975, 138f). Let us now draw out this idea by showing 
the positionality of plants and non-human animals before turning to Plessner’s 
conception of human beings. A plant has an ‘open positionality’, in the sense that it 
has no relationship to its positionality. This means that neither the inside, nor the 
outside of the boundary, has a centre, for “the plant is characterised by a boundary 
which has no one or nothing on either side, neither subject nor object” (de Mul 2014, 
16; Plessner GS V, 282f). Non-human animals, however, have a centre (‘closed 
positionality’) and hence have a relationship to their own positionality. Non-human 
animal organisms have a centric organisation, which means that its “boundary is 
mediated by a centre, which at a physical level can be localised in the nervous 
system, and at the psychic level is characterised by awareness of the environment” 
(de Mul 2014, 16). The non-human animal, then, is distinct from the plant in that it is 
‘in’ its body.  
Differentiating herself from both plants and non-human animals, the human 
being not only has a boundary mediated by a centre, localised in both the physical 
and phenomenological, but she also has an awareness and relationship with her 
centre, what is termed as a ‘second mediation’. Human beings have an awareness 
of their centre of experience, which Plessner terms as ‘eccentric’, for “[e]ccentrically 
positioned, he stands there where he stands, and at the same time he does not 
stand there where he stands” (Plessner 1975, 342 quoted in Coolen 2014, 120). 
Therefore, “Man not only lives (Lebt) and experiences his life (erlebt) but he also 
experiences his experience of life” (Plessner GS V, 364).  As Moss notes, "[t]he aim 
of Plessner's anthropology was to find a mind/body neutral language that could, in 
terms simultaneously empirically and phenomenological [be] meaningful, locate 
human beings amongst the continuum of lived organisms and yet also pick out the 
differentiate of their organismic being" (Moss 2007, 147). However, as Plessner 
wrote, as an eccentric being “man is not in an equilibrium, he is without a place, he 
stands outside time in nothingness, he is characterized by a constitutive 
homelessness (ist konstitutiv heimatlos) in its eccentricity. He always still has to 
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become ‘something’ and create an equilibrium for himself” (Plessner GS V, 385). We 
can see this in the distinction between a World (Welt) and the environment-surround 
(Umwelt) of Max Scheler et al (Scheler 2003, 39-45; Uexküll 1987), which are 
"biological foundations that lie at the very epicentre of the study of 
both communication and signification in the human [and non-human] animal” 
(Sebeok 1976, 194). Different organisms can have different Umwelten (the world that 
is experienced by an organism), whilst sharing the same environment. However, for 
the human being, the Welt is “its unity, its coherence, its interdependence and as 
such its intrinsic normativity” (Moss n.d, 5). It is in the alienation from one’s Umwelt 
that humans distinctively become open to the World, resulting in a potential space of 
subjective openness. This is how human beings are ‘artificial by nature’. The human 
being has a relationship to a a Welt, rather than an Umwelt, by its specific 
positionality of relating to its centre. This is to experience one’s experiences and thus 
become open to the world. For Plessner, the human being has three ‘worlds’, what 
Jos de Mul terms the “tripartite determinate of human existence” (de Mul 2014, 16). 
These three worlds are the ‘inner world’ (Innenwelt), the shared ‘socio-cultural world’ 
(Mitwelt), and the ‘outer world’ (Aussenwelt). The inner world is comprised of both 
‘soul’ (Seele), the source of our psychic life, and ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis), which 
one could view as the theatre where the psychic life takes place. The world of the 
Mitwelt, has an ‘I’ (Ich), the participant in culture and the ‘We’ (Wir), which is one who 
is in and is collectively shaping culture. As Majorie Grene notes in her foreword to 
Plessner’s Laughing and Crying (1970), “it is our eccentric position that gives to our 
existence the ambiguity, of necessity and freedom, contingency and significance, 
which it characteristically displays” (Grene 1970, xii). 
 
3.2 Laughing, Crying and Language 
Following on from this discussion of the Mitwelt, the shared, cultural world, let 
us return to McDowell’s argument for the acquisition of conceptual-rational capacities 
through the initiation of human infants into a linguistic community. As McDowell has 
claimed, conceptual rationality is pervasive in our lives insofar as our lives are 
distinctly human. He has argued that an infant, one who is proto-subjective, is 
initiated into a linguistic community, and it is only when she is initiated into this 
linguistic community, by acquiring a natural language, and consequently ennobled 
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with a fully-fledged subjectivity, that she can be said to be truly minded. Yet, as we 
have seen in the second chapter, regarding mimesis and infant ‘we intentionality’, it 
appears, to echo Donald, that “[t]he quality of thoughts can be improved with 
language. But thoughts do not start there or end there, nor are they judged there” 
(Donald 2001, 265, 277). Mimesis provides the conditions for McDowell’s linguistic 
community and conceptual-rationality, without being linguistic and conceptual in of 
itself. Mindedness, it appears, precedes language and, thereby, by extension, 
McDowell’s conceptual rationality. As Moss10 notes the human being’s “socio-cultural 
existence is first of all a kind of collectivity of mind. […] Prior to the individuation of 
identities and self-consciousness” (Moss 2007, 142). On a reading of Merleau-Ponty, 
we can see an account of this intersubjective significance to the expressivity of the 
body found in pre-linguistic, and hence ‘uninitiated’, infant human beings: 
          
A fifteen month-old infant opens his mouth when I playfully take one of his 
fingers in my mouth and pretend to bite it […] “Biting” has an immediate 
intersubjective significance for him. He perceives his intentions in his body, 
perceives my body with his own, and thereby perceives my intentions in his 
body (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 368). 
 
Hence, the human being, the adult that McDowell claims is’ minded with a 
pervasively conceptual rationality, cannot be exhaustively characterized within the 
confines of his linguistic community. It appears there is a limit to reason in the human 
being. As Joachim Fischer notes, “Philosophical Anthropology, by contrast (to a 
linguistic turn) takes the process of life as its starting point, from whose break in 
continuity language springs as just one medium among others to bridge the divide 
(Fischer 2009, 169). Language, then, is an offshoot, rather than the constitutive stem 
of the human being. As hitherto noted, humans live simultaneously in three worlds: 
                                                
10 Moss (2013; 2015) provides a diachronic account of the human being, the ‘Hybrid 
Hominin’, in which mindedness was initially absent in the individual, but rather there was a 
‘Groupish’ psychology of mindedness (Freud 1959): the Hominin Group. This is what Moss 
terms as a first detachment from the surround. The Hominin Group set the conditions and 
normative requirements for a second detachment, the partial individuation of the Hominin 
from the Hominin Group. This resulted in a human being both a part of the Group and also 
the partially individuated ‘I’, what Moss terms the ‘Hybrid Hominin’. 
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the inner world (Innenwelt), an outer world (Aussenwelt) and a shared, cultural world 
(Mitwelt). The mutual world, the Mitwelt, is, as Phillip Honenberger notes, a world 
“correlated to the world wherein person live with (Mit) […] split between awareness 
of oneself as an individual and unique and awareness of oneself as sharing in a 
common and interchangeable status or experience […]” (Honenberger 2015, 15). 
Hence, there is an ‘I’ (Ich) distinguished from other individuals; yet, one also is like 
other individuals, a ‘We’ (Wir). As Scheler further notes, the essential character of 
human consciousness is such that the community is insome sense implicit in every 
individual, and that man is not only part of society, but that society and the social 
bond are an essential part of himself.( Scheler 2009, 229-230) 
To return to McDowell, he has argued that “[c]reatures without conceptual 
capacities lack self-consciousness and – this is part of the same package – 
experience of objective reality” and thus infants “do not have the spontaneity of the 
understanding” (Lovibond 2008, 113), for, to recall, proto-subjective infants only have 
a ‘potential’. Lacking the ‘rational response to the deliverances of experience’, for 
proto-subjective infants, we do not have the idea of rational response which requires 
subjects “who are in charge of their thinking, standing ready to reassess what is a 
reason for what, and to change their responsive propensities accordingly” (McDowell 
1996, 114). This response to reasons, as we have seen, is brought about through 
the initiation into a natural language, a linguistic community. Yet, I have proposed 
that there are pre-conditions to conceptual-rationality that are not themselves rational 
in the linguistic and conceptual sense. Furthermore, we are shown by Plessner 
particular instances of a human being’s experience that is irrevocably inexpressible 
in language. For instance, in Plessner’s conception of laughing and crying, we 
cannot reduce the moments of this crying and laughter down to propositional, 
linguistic articulation. To laugh, is to laugh ‘about something’; yet the awareness of 
this ‘something’, is something that is the reason for our laughter; “[i]t is not my body 
but I who laugh [...] and for a reason, ‘about something’” (Plessner LW 227/LC 25). 
One could argue, in the same vein as that of McDowell, that our rational capacities, 
enabled by our enculturation and initiation into our linguistic community, allows us to 
retroactively apply the ‘I do’ to past actions – the past action and cause of laughter, 
for instance. However, to unpack this point, let us requote from the first chapter of 
this paper regarding the sharing of conceptual form in the exercise of conceptual 
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capacities in both unreflective and reflective action, in which McDowell’s argument is 
that: 
 
what is important is this: if an experience is world disclosing […], all its content 
is present in a form in which […] it is suitable to constitute contents of 
conceptual capacities (McDowell 2013b, 319). 
 
Yet, laughing and crying cannot be propositionally articulated and to retroactively 
reflect upon an unreflective action, such as laughter, does not mean this reflection is 
exhaustive of the act, nor is it linguistically articulable. As Matthias Schloβberger 
notes, what is proposed (by those such as McDowell) to be graspable in thought and 
language is ungraspable, for “[e]ven though they can relate to it as an object, they 
are not in complete control of it, as phenomena such as laughing and crying 
illustrate” (Schloβberger (2014, 307). 
 
3.3 Disrupting Dreyfus’ Flow 
Let us return to Dreyfus and his issue of the absence of a qualitative 
phenomenological mineness when in absorption. Dreyfus stated that “[w]hen Dasein 
is totally merged with the world, there is no place for content, neither experiential nor 
propositional – there is nothing in any sense inner” (2013, 29; Dreyfus 2006, 117). 
Dreyfus endorsed and referred to Merleau-Ponty to articulate his absorbed coping 
claim, that "in perception we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves 
thinking it, we are given over to the object and we merge into this body which is 
better informed than we are about the world, and about motives we have and means 
at our disposal” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 227). Yet, as I queried, how do we step back 
from this absorption if the body is ‘better informed than we are about the world’? 
What allows us to access and to thematise what the body knows, enabling us to step 
back into reflection. For the eccentricity of the human being, as Plessner’s third 
anthropological law states (Plessner 1975), the human being is “[e]ccentrically 
positioned, he stands there where he stands, and at the same time he does not 
stand there where he stands” (Plessner 1975, 342 quoted in Coolen 2014, 120). To 
simplify this, Plessner’s quote can be viewed, from the perspective of the body, as 
the constant tension between having a body and being a body, never being just one, 
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nor the other, thus being able to always take a stance from the objectural 
perspective of the body-as-object or the lived body. 
As Dreyfus wrote, in our absorption we still have the “capacity to step back 
and criticize any particular proposition about what is the case and any reason for 
one’s actions” and “[…] a primordial non-conceptual mode of coping on the basis of 
which the conceptual world makes sense” (Dreyfus 2013, 21-22). Yet, from 
Plessner’s formulation of the human being as eccentric, we can begin to reconcile 
Dreyfus’ resignatory response to how, in distinction to other creatures, human beings 
are able to step back from their environment. As shown, under Plessner, we have an 
‘in-betweeness’ via our eccentric positionality. For example, I feel a pain, the lived 
experience of pain through the perspective of the lived body, my lived body is 
attuned directly to its environment, through its mode of appearance, an 
“environmental intentionality”, which as Krüger notes (2014), is a term that Merleau-
Ponty later adopts. On an analysis of Plessner, however, we can see that he argues 
that the characteristic human mode of being in the world connected with eccentric 
positionality forbids us from leading a life in which we experience our own body 
exclusively in the sort of absorbed coping that Dreyfus propounds. For, as well as 
being the lived body, I also take up the objectural stance, that it is, say, ‘a wrist that 
is broken’, to my body. As another example, we could see this objectural stance as 
taking a mediating route through scientific representation of the objectural 
perspective of diagnosing my body as having a distal radius fracture. As this is a 
psychophysical unity, the eccentric position means that one always strives to find a 
centre, but is in perpetual oscillation between the two positions of the lived body and 
the body-as-object. This psychophysical unity can be taken to its extreme, as 
illustrated by Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk, in that, during one’s experience 
of pain, one is “being stricken in his utmost intimate unity, his psycho-physical 
naturalness, through which the ego comes in conflict with its own body, whereas it 
nevertheless remains bound to the body in all its painfulness (Buytendijk 1943, 170). 
Furthermore, as hitherto quoted by Coolen on his analysis of Plessner, “our 
specific eccentric openness to the world forbids our body to merge fully with its role 
of mediated coping. Therefore, we can always be thrown out of the flow of our 
absorbed coping, thus being forced to step back and reflect”. (Coolen 2014, 124). In 
distancing ourselves from the existential phenomenology of Dreyfus, we can view 
that, for reiteration, the “characteristic human mode of being in the world connected 
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with eccentric positionality forbids us from leading a life in which we experience our 
own body ‘only in its mediality, in its mediating role’” (Coolen 2014, 124). Hence, 
given Plessner’s distinction of boundary formation of non-human animals and 
humans, under the definition of Dreyfus’ absorption via this analysis of Plessner, this 
appears to suggest that full absorption can only be seen in non-human animals. 
Non-human animals lack the experience of experience of the second mediation. 
Therefore, Dreyfus’ absent ego is discordant with an account of the double 
aspectivity of our human lives of both being a lived body and a body-as-object. As 
Bernard Prusak elegantly summarises, “only somebody who has himself can lose 
himself.” (Prusak 2006, 51).  
To assess the sort of performative absorption Dreyfus speaks of with regards 
to chess players, baseball players, and so on, we can return to, and view, in 
Montero’s discussion of absorption that, contrary to that of Dreyfus’ egoless 
absorption, in the person’s performance “[t]he awareness of tension and relaxation 
within his own body, the sense of balance that distinguishes the proud stability of the 
vertical from the risky adventures of thrusting and falling – these are the tools of the 
dancer” (Montero 2013, 303 – my emphasis). Here we can see, on the background 
of our reading of Plessner’s eccentricity that, rather than performing at our best when 
the ego is absent, the awareness of this tension, the relaxation of the muscles as the 
dancer flows from one posture to the next, suggests that there is a constant 
mediation, the tension between being a lived body and objectifying one’s 
experiences and actions as the body-as-object. As as Sanekke de Haan notes, 
“there is precisely no split between a monitoring mind and a functioning body” (de 
Haan & Fuchs 2010, 332). In the following section, I will develop this critique of 
Dreyfus’ absence of the ego and McDowell’s absence of the pre-linguistic ‘we’ via an 
analysis of the disruption of eccentric positionality in people with schizophrenia. 
 
3.4 The Disruption of Dreyfus-McDowell 
Plessner proposed that laughing and crying disclose to us “the secret 
composition of human nature,” which “constitutes the basis of laughing and crying” 
(LW 236, 235/LC 33, 32), revealing our eccentric positionality. However, I query, 
where does laughing and crying end, and pathology, a psychopathology, begin? As 
Krüger notes, in our laughing and crying: 
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We are losing our distance and self-control […] In crying, we break down into 
the lived body. In laughing, we break out of the lived body. In the first case, 
we lose a sense of proportion in general. In the second case, we reap too 
many mutually inconsistent meanings of possible responses (Krüger 2009, 
202).  
 
Could an analysis of Plessner’s ‘person’, losing their ability to mediate, such 
as in laughter and crying, show similar traits to that within the realm of mental 
disorders, in which there are ambiguous and inconsistent meanings, losses of 
distance and self-control and, even ontological confusions of personhood? I believe 
so. To recall, for Plessner, what he defines as a ‘person’ is the “subject of its 
experiences, of its perceptions and its actions, of its initiative. It knows and it wills” 
(Grene 1970, xii). If Plessner’s definition of a ‘person’ correlates with these 
constitutive elements of the human being, then a disruption of these elements should 
result in a disruption of personhood itself, a prolonged bout of laughter or tears. It is, 
specifically, with the experiences of people with schizophrenia that I wish to pursue 
this approach, and to apply this to the Dreyfus-McDowell debate; for what constitutes 
the human being are central questions that, as has been shown, have not been 
satisfactorily answered by either men. That which makes schizophrenia unique, in 
contrast to other mental disorders that, for example, manifest psychosis, such as 
type I bipolar, is that schizophrenia is a self-disorder (or ipseity disturbance). As 
shown by Parnas & Handest (2003), studies conducted with people with 
schizophrenia indicate “collectively that self-disorders are specific to the 
schizophrenia spectrum conditions” (Sass and Parnas 2003, 437). As Krueger notes, 
schizophrenia “is likely due not just to a neurophysiological abnormality but 
additionally to the experiential distance many people with schizophrenia feel from 
their body as a lived through subject of experience and action”.Through this more 
experimentally and lived approach to the disorder, one concludes that schizophrenia 
is not “exclusively neural”; rather, it is subjectively experiential, situated and agential” 
(Krueger 2018, n.p). As discussed in my critique of Dreyfus in the second chapter 
regarding absorption, in which he argues that “[i]n fully absorbed coping, there is no 
immersed ego, not even an implicit one” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 374)” I argued that, in 
fact, even when stripping back, for instance, the ‘autobiographical’ self (Dennett 
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1971; 1991; Damasio 2012) or the extended self (Clark and Chalmers 1998), there 
is, at the core level, a minimal self, a qualitative mineness. Additionally, this also also 
precedes the linguistic community and conceptual rationality of McDowell. The 
person with schizophrenia, “suffers from what may be called a disembodiment of the 
self. She does not ‘inhabit’ her body any more” (Fuchs 2005, 101). There is an 
absence of “every perception, movement or thought [which] is the experience of at 
least a minimal self” (de Haan & Fuchs 2010, 328). Under a reading of Plessner’s 
eccentricity, we can view schizophrenia as a disruption of eccentricity. Contrary to 
Krüger’s summary of eccentricity being mediated, in which “there is precisely no split 
between a monitoring mind and a functioning body” (de Haan & Fuchs 2010, 332), 
we a find phenomenon quite to the contrary. There is a split of the psychophysical 
unity of Plessner’s person, resulting in a flight to either the body-as-object or the 
lived body. Dreyfus, McDowell and Plessner are all driving at what qualifies as the 
core constitutive elements of the human being, whether that be from a conceptual-
rational, phenomenological absorption or eccentric approach. In an analysis of 
schizophrenia, so stated as a disturbance of the minimal self, then, we can begin to 
approach these questions of the human from the ground up. This disturbance, an 
‘ontological confusion’ at the core of the disorder is conveyed by one person with 
schizophrenia who noted that “I looked just like every other child, but inside I was 
different. It is as if I am another creature that somehow ended up inside a human 
body” (Henriksen and Nordgaard 2014, 426 – my emphasis). A further distortion of 
laughter and crying appears to be uncannily akin to the experiences of people with 
schizophrenia, who lose the sense that they are the ongoing subject of their 
experience, lose a grip on perceptions and actions, and have an ambiguity of the 
relation between mind and world. Plessner’s ‘person’, it seems, becomes disrupted. 
In showing eccentricity as constitutive of the human being via an analysis of its 
breakdown, we additionally lend further credence to the argument that a reciprocal 
relation of Dreyfus and McDowell, mediated by Plessner’s eccentric positionality, 
enables us to characterise the constitutive elements of the human being. 
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric illness characterised by abnormal behaviours, 
described as a ‘loss of vital contact with reality’ (Minkowski 1927); a disparity and 
disintegration of and within experience and thought. Karl Jaspers summarised the 
essential characteristics of schizophrenia as “incoherence, dissociation, fragmenting 
of consciousness, [...] weakness of apperception, insufficiency of psychic activity and 
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disturbance of association” (Jaspers 1968, 581). A common method of 
characterizing the symptoms of people with schizophrenia has been to parse it into 
the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ symptoms. The positive symptoms are “experiences of 
something being ‘made’” (Jaspers 1968, 582 - quoted in Fuchs 2005, 270), which we 
can say as being the ‘addition’ of something onto experience. Conversely, the 
‘negative’ symptoms are ‘something being taken away’ from experience. Hence, the 
positive symptoms are comprised of hallucinations and being subject to delusional 
behaviour and thought, essentially the addition of experiences that otherwise would 
be absent for someone in a non-psychotic state (discounting hallucinogenic drug 
use, fevers and so on). The negative symptoms, then, are comprised of anhedonia, 
alogia (paucity of speech), apathy, as well as autistic symptoms11 - a “lack of 
common sense” (Blankenburg 2001). This lack of common sense is the absence of 
“self-evident embeddedness in the world, in other words […] a fundamental 
connectedness” (de Haan & Fuchs 2010, 331).  
Furthermore, there is a further compensatory response of hyper-reflexivity, a 
flight, exclusively, to the body-as-object, in which “dispositional and habitual aspects 
of the self that are normally present in the background of awareness – e.g. the way 
one thinks, listens, speaks, interacts with others and the environment, are thrust to 
the foreground of awareness and made into objects of intense scrutiny (Krueger 
2018, 21). This results, as Mads Gram Henriksen, Alessandro Salice (2015), 
Sanekke de Haan and Thomas Fuchs (2010) note, as the person with schizophrenia 
suffering from a lack of integration with others: a ‘Disrupted We’ (Salice and 
Henriksen 2015). Hence, here one can draw comparisons with Dreyfus’ disturbance 
of mineness, and McDowell’s oversight of the ‘we’ pre-conceptual, mimetic 
‘sociocultural milieu’. Returning to the previously quoted passage regarding laughter 
and crying by Krüger, in a disruption of eccentricity in schizophrenia there is the loss 
of a “sense of proportion in general”, and a reaping of “too many mutually 
inconsistent meanings of possible responses. (Krüger 2009, 202). 
 
3.5 Dreyfus, Disrupted.  
                                                
11 In the pre-1960s sense of autism associated with schizophrenia, not modern-day 
infantile-autism. 
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 As Fuchs notes in relation to Plessner, the lived body is “mediated by 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness [implying] a basic auto-affection which 
could also be called the background feeling of being alive [ (Fuchs, 2015b, 272 – my 
emphasis). For the lived body, when experiencing something, contrary to Dreyfus’ 
claim for mindless absorption, a ‘mineness’ is still present, for there is still an 
apperceptive element to one’s experiences. To have a self requires a self to be there 
in the first place. The lived body is experienced qualitatively. Hence, a directedness 
towards an affordance, for instance, is “not to be understood as an intentional 
experience that only gains a reference to the self afterwards” (Zahavi 2013, 327), i.e 
via detachment into self-reflection. Rather, the self discloses itself in its directedness, 
as “every worldly experiencing involves a certain component of self-acquaintances 
[…] every experiencing is characterised by the fact that “I am always somehow 
acquainted with myself”” (Zahavi 2013, 329; Heidegger 1997, 251).  
Yet, as noted, Dreyfus’ absorbed coping requires zero self-monitoring 
whatsoever, for any self-monitoring would be disruptive: a non-qualitative 
phenomenology. Dreyfus’ ‘mineness’, I propose, which lacks qualitative experience, 
can be seen as more akin to a person with schizophrenia’s hyper-automaticity, an 
almost mechanical process which lacks any self-monitoring at all, due to the 
disembodiment of the self associated with the disease. For instance, as a person 
with schizophrenia, L.N, reports, “I can do things without even noticing. I get up, I 
brush my teeth, I get back, and I cannot even remember what I have done in 
between […a] complete automatism” (Salice and Henriksen 2015 – my emphasis). 
These experiences, or lack thereof, are strikingly similar to the non-qualitative 
phenomenology of Dreyfus’ claim. For Plessner, one’s self-feeling or auto-affection is 
“present in every perception; aware-ness of the world always includes a tacit 
awareness of oneself in relation to the world […] self-referentiality that is rooted in 
the auto-affectivity of the body is indeed imparted to all our perceptions, actions, and 
thoughts” (Fuchs (2005, 96). Yet, given an analysis of people with schizophrenia’s 
hyper-automaticity, there appears to be the same absence of a qualitative 
phenomenology in Dreyfus as there is reflected in people with schizophrenia. In 
leaning too much towards a distortion of the lived body (i.e. disrupting the mineness 
of the lived body), personhood becomes disrupted. As Julian Jaynes notes in the 
experiences of disruption of affectivity, the disruption of mineness, of people with 
schizophrenia, leads to a situation where “[t]ime crumbles. We behave without 
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knowing it. Our mental space begins to vanish [...] And in that nowhere, we are 
somehow automatons, unknowing what we do […] (Jaynes 1976, 404). 
Given the inability to mediate between an inner and outer, this process can 
also result in a dissolution of the space, the boundary between the distinction of 
one’s own inner experiences as a lived body, and one’s relation to the other. This 
results in, as Fuchs notes, a situation in which “the agency of one’s movement 
seems to come from the outside, and an inversion of intentionality results” (Fuchs 
2003). Due to the loss of being the origin of their thoughts and actions - one’s 
diminished self-affectivity - the background meaning given by the foundations of this 
self-affection disintegrates. As Jaspers notes, the person with schizophrenia does 
not know why “he has this thought nor did he not know why he has this thought nor 
did he intend to have it. He does not feel master of his own thoughts and in 
addition he feels in the power of some incomprehensible external force. (Jaspers, 
1963: 122–123). Therefore, this results in, to echo the words of a person with 
schizophrenia, one’s “consciousness is not as whole as it should be’; ‘I am simply 
unconscious’; ‘My I-feeling is diminished’; “My I is disappearing for me”; (quoted in 
Parnas and Handest 2003). The person with schizophrenia, in episodes of 
diminished self-affection, resulting in hyper-automaticity, no longer experiences the 
experiences of her life. To draw comparisons back to Krüger’s analysis of laughing 
and crying, it appears that this diminished self-affection results in “losing our distance 
[…] we lose a sense of proportion in general” (Krüger 2009, 201). This  dissolution of 
boundaries reflects that of a disturbance of the relation to the Mitwelt, in which one is 
sharing a world with others, as well as a unique individual person, the ‘We’ and ‘I’ 
respectively. This results in this distinction of ‘We’ and ‘I’ to blur, resulting in what 
Jeynes reports of people with schizophrenia hearing “voices of impelling importance 
that criticise us and tell us what to do. At the same time, we seem to lose the 
boundaries of ourselves. (Jaynes 1976, 404 – my emphasis). 
 
3.6 McDowell’s Disrupted ‘We’ 
The destabilisation of the lived body often results in a compensatory response 
in which, I propose, people with schizophrenia ‘fly’ to the opposite end of their 
eccentric position, to the body-as-object. This results in the hyper-objectification of 
their actions and perceptual experiences, as they attempt to gain a stronger grip 
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upon their actions and perceptual experiences, termed as a hyper-reflexivity. This 
hyper-reflexivity enacts further self-estrangement, for, to requote, the “dispositional 
and habitual aspects of the self that are normally present in the background of 
awareness – e.g. the way one thinks, listens, speaks, interacts with others and the 
environment, are thrust to the foreground of awareness and made into objects of 
intense scrutiny (Krueger 2018, 21). As Salice and Henriksen note in relation to their 
analysis of disruption of ‘we-intentionality’: 
 
[s]ome of the most frequently reported self-disorders include feelings of being 
radically different from others and of not feeling self-present and present in 
the world, loss of common sense, hyper-reflectivity, transitivistic phenomena, 
and quasi-solipsistic experiences [… the feeling of being radically different 
from others” (Salice and Henriksen 2015, 162 – my emphasis) 
 
As Plessner noted, as “an eccentric being man is not in an equilibrium, he is 
without a place, he stands outside time in nothingness, he is characterized by a 
constitutive homelessness (ist konstitutiv heimatlos)”. The human being has, 
therefore, a “fundamental need for compensation given by human eccentricity” 
(Boccignon 2014, 183), for “he always still has to become ‘something’ and create an 
equilibrium for himself” (Plessner GS V, 385). Through this natural artificiality, and 
fundamental need for compensation, we strive to find equilibrium in our eccentricity 
and the artificial dimension of culture, a kind of second nature, “where man finds its 
homeland (Heimat) and its absolute rootedness (Verwurzelung), both are which are 
not provided by its ‘first’ nature’” (Plessner GS IV, 391 – quoted in Boccignone, 2014, 
184). The third world of the Mitwelt is where a person lives-with (Mit), and has an 
awareness of oneself as an individual and unique person, as well as one who is 
sharing this world with others, the ‘I’ and the ‘We’, “sharing in a common and 
interchangeable status or experience […]” (Honenberger 2015, 15). On the affective 
level between the ‘I’ and ‘We’, we can draw inspiration from Giovanna Colombetti’s 
concept of a ‘feeling close’. This feeling close draws the distinction between that of 
basic empathy, which one can define as an experience of the Other, to a sense of 
connectedness with them which relies on the affective (I experience the source of 
feeling) rather than a judgement (she is feeling). This can be expressed by Edith 
Stein’s analysis in which “[a] special edition of the paper reports that the fortress has 
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fallen. As we hear this, all of us are seized by an excitement, a joy, a jubilation. We 
all have ‘the same feeling’” (Stein 1989, 17 quoted in Colombetti 2013, 181). this 
produces a greater sense of unity with the other in addition to basic empathy, a 
grander unity reflecting the Mitwelt12. Yet, as the term feeling close suggests, the 
distinction between self and other is not lost, for the comprehension of the others’ 
feeling is identified as being the same as my own; from the “’I’ and ‘you’ arises the 
‘we’ as a subject of a higher level’” (Stein 1989, 17) – there is still a boundary. As 
Fuchs notes, to have an eccentric positionality is to regard that “the distinction of 
perceiver and perceived implies a continuous oscillation between one’s own 
embodied centre and the simulation of the other’s stance and perspective” (Fuchs 
2005, 104). However, due to the person with schizophrenia’s resultant hyper-
reflexivity the person with schizophrenia loses their ‘common sense’ of tacit societal 
rules, the boundaries of the Mitwelt’s ‘I’ and ‘We’, resulting in quasi-solipsistic 
experiences. As Joel Krueger notes, “as a result, the spontaneity, fluidity, and 
naturalness of everyday interactions is lost, and the individual struggles to smoothly 
connect with others and the surrounding environment” (Krueger 2018, 21). This 
results in the person with schizophrenia having a “loss of common sense [that] is not 
a lack of any sort of ‘knowledge’, but rather of a basic attunement with the world and 
of a pre-reflective grasp of the meaning of everyday social interactions” (Salice and 
Henriksen 2015, 163). Furthermore, as suggested previously by Donald, ‘mimesis’ 
“underlies all modern cultures and forms the most basic medium of human 
communication” (Donald 2001, 271), which are “expressive nonverbal actions. 
Mimetic culture is the murky realm of eye contact, facial expressions, poses, attitude, 
body language […]” (Donald 2001, 265). Yet, this same failure of the ‘murky realm’ of 
eye contact, facial expressions and so on is reflected in people with schizophrenia’s 
inability to ‘read’ and affectively link with others. This s most notable if we refer to a 
quote by a person with schizophrenia in Blankenburg’s (1971, 308) report: 
 
What is it that I am missing? It is something so small, but strange, it is 
something so important […] I ﬁnd that I no longer have footing in the world. I 
have lost a hold in regard to the simplest, everyday things […] every person 
                                                
12 See also: Hrdy, S. (2009) Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual 
Understanding (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
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knows how to behave, to take a direction, or to think something speciﬁc... All 
these involve rules that the person follows (Blankenburg 1971, 308 quoted by 
Parnas 2014, 28 – my emphasis) 
 
To refer again to Krüger’s analysis of laughing and crying, this diminishment 
of the ‘we’, the flight to the body-as-object, resembles, too, that of laughter, in which 
“we reap too many mutually inconsistent meanings of possible responses” (Krüger 
2009, 202), resulting in a paralysis by analysis, or what the playwright and artist 
Antonin Artaud, who had a history of schizophrenia, as ‘violent overflow of thoughts’. 
McDowell’s language community for the articulation of experiences, conceptually, is 
certainly a rich and normatively structured way of opening up the world. However, we 
also require the pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual aspect of our lives. A disturbance of 
this through hyper-reflexivity results in a loss of the ‘common sense’ that grounds us 
as socially and affectively linked with others. This disturbance results in a situation 
where the person with schizophrenia, states that “I am not able to recognise what 
these rules are. I am missing the basics... I don’t know what to call this... It is not 
knowledge... Every child knows these things! (Blankenburg 1971, 308 quoted by 
Parnas 2014, 28) 
 
Conclusion to Chapter Three 
 In this chapter I have argued, through my mediation of Dreyfus and 
McDowell’s ontological gulf, via Plessner’s eccentricity, that due to a person’s 
eccentric positionality, she is able to take a position as the lived body and also the 
position as the body-as-object. However, through an analysis the disruption of 
eccentricity in people with schizophrenia, I showed that this disruption results in a 
‘flight’, to an over-emphasis of either the lived body or the body-as-object. The 
person manifests, reflecting Dreyfus’ claim, hyper-automaticity, a non-qualitative 
phenomenology of mindlessness, as well as diminished self-affectivity. Furthermore, 
this fragility of self-affectivity, the lack of autonomy, results in a heteronomy which 
leads to what Schloβberger notes as leading to the phenomena that “one’s own 
“nature” is determined by others […] characterized by a violent moment of 
heteronomy (Schloβberger 2014, 305). Montero characterised Dreyfus’ principle, the 
principle of automaticity, as that which, “when all is going well […] performance 
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significantly involves neither self-reflective thinking, nor planning, nor predicting, nor 
deliberation, not mental effort (Montero 2013, 304). However, it appears that this 
principle of automaticity reflects that of a person with schizophrenia’s experiences of 
hyper-automaticity, rather than the effortless flow of Montero’s ballet dancer, 
suggesting that one’s ‘effortless flow’ requires the constant mediation between being 
the lived body and having a body, as the body-as-object. On McDowell’s side, 
lacking the pre-linguistic ‘we-intentionality’ and mimetic capacities of the human 
being, we are left with a person who cannot understand the tacit rules of life. The 
person with schizophrenia is locked into hyper-reflexivity, objectifying all of her 
experiences, in which what was once tacitly taken in experience explodes into a 
violent overflow of thoughts, leading to a quasi-solipsism, a loss of touch with the 
world. 
Hence, to conclude this chapter, it appears that Dreyfus and McDowell are 
locked into one side or another of Plessner’s eccentric being, rather than mediating 
between the two. Their claims result in the person being either exclusively open to 
the world and mindlessly absorbed or treating everything in hyper-reflection, in a 
violent overflow of thoughts. Dreyfus over-emphasises the lived body, reflected in the 
person with schizophrenia’s inner world being diminished in self-affectivity or feeling 
invaded by other. Conversely, in over-emphasising the body-as-object they are 
exclusively the body-as-object, treating others and the world with hyper-reflexivity, 
causing them to become distanced from the socio-cultural world of the ‘we’. Hence, 
this analysis suggests that to take McDowell or Dreyfus’ claim by themselves results 
in the same kind of ‘ontological fuzziness’ described by people with schizophrenia, 
suggesting a reciprocal relation between these two claims, mediated via Plessner’s 
eccentric positionality, constitutes, and is essential, to our personhood. 
 
	 70	
Conclusion 
The Eccentric Person 
 
Contrary to being McDowell’s essentially rational animal, or Dreyfus’ egoless 
absorbed coper, there is, instead, a third way that can reconcile the two’s claims. 
This reconciliation is through Helmuth Plessner’s eccentric positionality, in which a 
person modulates being both, and never exclusively, a lived body and a body-as-
object. 
Chapter One began with McDowell’s claim for conceptual rationality, as well 
as the historic background for his inspiration and counter-arguments for this claim.  
McDowell claimed that to be the human being is to be an essentially rational animal. 
Dreyfus, by contrast, contended that there is a pre-rational, pre-conceptual ‘ground 
floor’ to human experience that eludes McDowell’s conceptualist claim. In seeking to 
avoid Sellars’ Myth of the Given, Dreyfus argues, McDowell overreaches, resulting in 
a new Myth: The Myth of the Mental. This is the Myth that rationality pervades all 
human experience, rather than being just one aspect on the background of the 
human being’s way of being. 
 I introduced Dreyfus’ critique by drawing on his distinction between the ‘rule 
following’ ‘beginner’, which he equates with McDowell’s conceptually-rational person, 
and his ‘expert’ skilful coper (such as a professional athlete) who does not follow 
rules, but rather ‘just does it’, skilfully performing as the expert or master without rule 
following. However, when we are detached and rule-following, Dreyfus contends, we 
do not perform at our best. One issue I raised in response to Dreyfus’s critique of 
McDowell is that, given his analysis of Wittgenstein and Kripke’s ‘rule-following 
paradox’, McDowell, in fact, explicitly states there is no need to ‘detach’ from the 
world if one is to follow a certain rule. For McDowell, we are always already 
engaging with the world. This non-detached rule-following is brought about through 
the background of our upbringing into culture. Subsequently, Dreyfus turned his 
attention to questions of the mindlessness of our absorbed coping. For Dreyfus, 
contrary to McDowell, in absorption there is no ego present, for one is mindless in 
unreflective action. To reflect or ‘step back’, Dreyfus argues, is to be stripped of the 
richness of affordances that solicit us. However, I suggested that this is not in fact 
McDowell’s position. McDowell argues that conceptual rationality is operative in both 
unreflective and reflective action; hence, for McDowell, rather than an ‘I think’ being 
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required for the ego to be present, there is an ‘I do’. Making an absorbed situation 
explicit does not cause a ‘step back’ into rationality, for the unreflective action was 
conceptual in the first place. Making content explicit in conscious reflection, 
therefore, does not contradict the fact that it was conceptual already even in 
unreflective action. However, this raises a query, and an issue: how does one move 
from unreflective action to reflection? McDowell argued that unreflective action is 
conceptual already. However, I suggested that to assert blankly that unreflective 
action and reflective action share a conceptual form (that things are ‘thus and so’ or 
‘in view’ depending on McDowell’s earlier and later works respectively) is not 
sufficient to prove this point. Furthermore, given the fine-grainedness of colour 
perception, it appears that, such find-grained shades purple34, red24, etc., elude 
conceptual articulation, despite McDowell’s counter-suggestion for demonstrative 
concepts.  
Chapter Two first addressed issues regarding McDowell’s ‘mindedness’, 
which is understood and enabled by way of an initiation into a linguistic community. 
To become equipped with the faculties of conceptual rationality, a ‘proto-subjective’, 
and thus mindless, in McDowell’s sense, infant is initiated into a linguistic 
community, and thereby becomes truly minded. I argued, however, that McDowell’s 
definition of mindedness is too strict. McDowell overlooks the specifically human 
forms of ‘we’-mindedness and intentionality present in infants. Infants, but not non-
human animals, display an ability to enforce norms, and belong to a normatively 
structured world that is specifically human. Additionally, Merlin Donald’s concept of 
mimesis offers McDowell another distinctly human form of expression that eludes 
conceptual-rationality. Dreyfus, I proposed, is unable to explain how the 
phenomenologist ‘steps back’ from absorption. I placed emphasis on Dreyfus’ 
explanation of a human being’s distinctive mineness. This mineness is what he 
argued differentiates humans from non-humans in absorption, the particular context 
of one’s affordances. I queried, however, how can we have a phenomenology of 
mineness, if one’s experiences in absorbed coping are non-qualitative - mindless? 
Dreyfus’ mineness is just the context of affordances, not the experience of such. As 
represented in Coolen’s critique, if we are truly egoless in the flow of absorption, 
“what kind of experience would force humans to give up their being absorbed in 
responding to solicitations that stem from affordances they come across in their 
world?” (Coolen, 2014, 190). In conclusion, I echoed Dreyfus succinct summary, and 
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quandary, regarding the debate, in that it “seems that the conceptualists can’t give 
an account of how we are involved in the world, while the phenomenologists can’t 
give an account for what makes it possible for us to step back and observe it” 
(Dreyfus 2007b, 364). 
 In Chapter Three, I sought for a reconciliation of Dreyfus and McDowell’s 
claims, to be able to countenance both the sort of objectural conceptually rational 
stance we take towards our bodies and others of McDowell, and the sort of 
absorption in the world that Dreyfus speaks of, through Plessner’s notion of 
‘eccentric positionality’. With human eccentricity, one mediates between being a 
body and having a body. Hence, Plessner’s eccentric positionality provides an ‘in-
between’ account of the human being: a ‘double aspectivity’ of, on one side, the lived 
body (Leib), that immediate lived experience of one’s experiences; and, on the other, 
the body-as-object (Körper), the objectural and public stance that we take towards 
our bodies. 
Further into the chapter, I provided an analysis of the pathology of 
schizophrenia, in which I concluded that due to a disturbance of the person with 
schizophrenia’s eccentricity, the person veers either to one side or the other of the 
Dreyfus-McDowell debate. The person flies to Dreyfus’ end of mindless hyper-
automaticity, or to the McDowell end of hyper-reﬂexivity and a diminished ‘we’. A 
loss of balance between these two poles of human phenomenological embodiment, 
results in a disrupted conception of personhood. As I quoted, “what many patients 
struggle to articulate is a feeling of being somehow ontologically different, ‘not really 
human’”, and that “I looked just like every other child, but inside I was different. It is 
as if I am another creature that somehow ended up inside a human body” (Henriksen 
& Nordgaard, 2014, 436 - quoted in Parnas & and Henriksen 2016, 77). Having 
analysed clinical findings from schizophrenia research, I proposed that we have 
provided empirical support for Plessner’s characterisation of eccentricity by viewing 
the resulting ontological fuzziness of personhood when it becomes disrupted. The 
conclusion of this chapter is to suggest that a successful conception of personhood 
involves and requires an oscillation between both “sides” of one’s eccentricity, for 
“Man not only lives (lebt) and experiences his life (erlebt), but he also experiences 
his experience of life” (Plessner 1975, 364). When eccentricity is disrupted, the 
person with schizophrenia’s hyperreflexivity or hyperautomaticity, appears to result in 
a person whose sense of personhood becomes fragile. It appears, then, that Dreyfus 
	 73	
and McDowell are describing reciprocal aspects of that nature of being human which 
are actually necessary and complementary to each other in the constitution of the 
human form of life. In bridging their claims via Plessner’s human eccentricity, we 
acquire a stable account of personhood. To be a person, is to be eccentric.  
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